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Abstract
Focusing on gay rights in the European Union, this Article addresses questions all dealing
with the likely dynamics of gay-rights development in Europen in the near future. This is done
by applying to the legal context of the European integration project of Kreimer’s vision of federalism, Karst’s analysis of the “freedom of intimate association,” and Koppelman’s representation
of sexual-orientation discrimination as sex discrimination. The argument will proceed as follows:
Part I gives a short outline of the importance of federalism for the preservation of liberty. Part II
will build on Koppelman’s analysis of the nature of sexual orientation discrimination as sex discrimination. Part III will apply the reasoning of the first two Parts to the legal context of European
integration, looking both at its potential and the limitations which its practical use in the European
context is likely to face.

ON OPTIONS OF CITIZENS AND MORAL
CHOICES OF STATES: GAYS AND EUROPEAN
FEDERALISM
Dimithy Kochenov*
"It is meaningless to speak of morality when there is no choice."
-Kenneth Karst 1
"Indeed, we have never held that moral disapproval, without any other
asserted state interest, is a sufficient rationale ... to justify a law that
discriminates among groups of persons."
2
-Sandra Day O'Connor
INTRODUCTION
There is no disagreement about the fact that "to be human
is to need to love and be loved." 3 Disagreements emerge once
legal/political decisions are to be taken to answer a question of
how far and under what conditions states can interfere with such
a vital aspect of our existence. Focusing on gay rights 4 in the
European Union ("EU" or "Union"), this Article addresses this
and a number of related questions, all dealing with the likely

* LL.M., Central European University, Budapest; LL.D., Groningen, Netherlands;
Assistant Professor of European Law, Department of European and Economic Law,
University of Groningen, Netherlands; Fellow, Groningen Graduate School of Law. The
argument contained in this Article has been presented at "The Global Arc of Justice:
Sexual Orientation Law around the World," UCLA Law School, Los Angeles, March
2009 and at "Enlargement-Five Years After: The State of European Integration and
New Challenges for the Discipline," Central European University, Budapest, May 2009. I
thank Judith A. Faucette and other participants of these conferences for their
comments, and Jacob van de Velden for his help. I kindly acknowledge the assistance of
Tamds Derzsy and Matthijs van Wolferen.
1. Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom ofIntimateAssociation, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 692 (1980).
2. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
3. Karst, supra note 1, at 632. For an analysis of the freedom of intimate association
in the context of more recent developments in the United States, see Nancy C. Marcus,
The Freedom of Intimate Association in the Twenty-first Century, 16 GEO. MASON U. Civ. RTS.
L.J. 269 (2006).
4. For the sake of simplicity, the term "gay" is used in this Article in reference to
both homosexual men and lesbian women.
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dynamics of gay-rights development in Europe in the near future.
This is done by applying to the legal context of the European
integration project of Kreimer's vision of federalism, 5 Karst's
analysis of the "freedom of intimate association,"6 and
Koppelman's representation of sexual-orientation discrimination
7
as sex discrimination.
Federalism protects liberty in many ways. Probably the
simplest of those is an exit option that it provides, as described by
Kreimer and other commentators." Simply put, if the moral
choices made by the member state of your residence (or
nationality) do not suit you, the obvious option open to all EU
citizens 9-just as to their U.S. counterparts-is to choose a
different state of residence, where the laws are less restrictive.
An exit option provided by federalism can teach us a great
deal about the future of protecting the "freedom of intimate
association" 10 in the EU. While the presence of an exit option is
indisputably inherent in the nature of virtually any federal
system, the legal specificity of the supranational community in
Europe" with its goal-oriented reading of competences and the
growing awareness of possible implications of its actions for
human rights protection 12 potentially opens a way also to an
"entry option" that would oblige member states to recognize less

5. Seith F. Kreimer, Federalismand Freedom, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI.,
66, 72-73 (2001).
6. Karst, supra note 1, at 624-25.
7. Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men is Sex
Discrimination,69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197 (1994).
8. E.g., Kreimer, supra note 5, at 72-73. See generally ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT,
VOICE, AND LOYALTY (1970) (discussing the exit option concept).
9. On the concept of European Union ("EU" or "Union") citizenship, see, inter
alia, Dimitry Kochenov, Ius Tractumn of Many Faces: European Citizenship and a Difficult
Relationship Between Status and Rights, 15 COLUM.J. EUR. L. 169 (2009), and the literature
cited therein.
10. Karst, supra note 1, at 625.
11. For analysis, see Alexander Somek, On Supranationality, 5 EUR. INTEGRATION
ONLINE PAPERS 1 (2001), http://eiop.or.at/eiop/pdf/2001-003.pdf.
12. On the protection of human rights in the EU context, see Bruno de Witte, The
Past and Future of the European Court ofJustice in the Protection of Human Rights, in THE EU
AND HUMAN RIGHTS 859 (Philip Alston ed., 1999); see also Grinne de Bfirca, The
European Court ofJustice and the InternationalLegal Order After Kadi (Jean Monnet Ctr. for
Int'l & Regional Econ. Law & Justice, Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 01/09, 2009),
available at h ttp:/ /centers.law.nyu.edu/jeanmonnet/ papers/09/0901 0l .pdf (describing
the relationship between the EU and the international legal order after the European
Court ofJustice ("ECJ") delivered the Kadi opinion).
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restrictive or simply different moral choices made by other states.
Outside of ideologically-charged areas of sexuality, gender
identity, and family law, such an "entry option" is already a dayto-day reality in the EU. Home-country rule in the free
movement of services law exemplifies the case in point.13
Besides the law of the EU and the member states, the law of
the Strasbourg human rights protection system is also capable of
influencing the legal regime governing EU member states'
deviations from the ideal of unrestricted freedom of intimate
association in Europe. 4 Consequently, analyzing the member
states' capacity to regulate, it is necessary to keep in mind three
important vectors of influence which can either fine-tune or even
overrule the regulation in question: other member states, the
EU, and the Council of Europe ("CoE").
In the words of Karst, "[s]ome of the primary values of
intimate association depend on th[e] sense of collectivity, the
shared1 5 sense that 'we' exist as something beyond 'you' and
'me."' The defense of these values comes down to upholding
the right to love and consequently, to happiness. Given its
overwhelming significance in the lives of virtually all human
beings, the freedom of intimate association, although unwritten,
is truly fundamental. As such, "[t]he freedom to choose our
intimates and to govern our day-to-day relations with them is
more than an opportunity for the pleasures of self-expression; it
is the foundation for the one responsibility among all others that
most clearly defines our humanity."' 6
This freedom provides an ideal testing ground for the level
of liberty in any constitutional system, national or supranational.
The scope of this freedom is very broad, potentially including a
huge variety of moral choices, such as the accessibility of divorce,
the right to have children (or not), intimate friendships,
adoption, abortion, cohabitation etc. The gay rights perspective
embraced herewith is thus just an illustration, opening the way to
the analysis in the context of other fields.

13. As articulated in Council Directive No. 2006/123/EC, 2006 OJ. L 376/36.
14. On the relations between the EU and the Council of Europe, see Tony Joris &
Jan Vandenberghe, The Council of Europe and the European Union: Natural Partners or
Uneasy Bed-Fellows?, 15 COLUM.J. EUR. L. 1 (2008-2009).
15. Karst, supra note 1, at 629.
16. Id. at 692.
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The current climate of rising tolerance and acceptance of
same-sex marriages 17 and unions, 18 as well as the growth in
importance of the principle of nondiscrimination did not result,
as of yet, in equal rights for homosexual citizens of the EU. 19 To
be fair, Europe is not a unique negative example in this regard,
as gay rights remain severely restricted on both sides of the
Atlantic and elsewhere in the world.20 Different rhetorical
constructs and "moral" justifications are cited in support of the
lasting injustice." Adopting Koppelman's perspective on sexual
orientation discrimination as sex discrimination 22 and building
on the legal edifice of the internal market and, in particular, EU
citizenship, this Article argues that the EU already possesses all

17. For an overview in the U.S. context, see Craig W. Christensen, In for Marriage?
On Securing Gay and Lesbian Family Values by "Simulacrum of Marriage," 66 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1699, 1700 (1998).
18. See YUVAL MERIN, EQUALITY FOR SAME-SEX COUPLES: THE LEGAL RECOGNITION
OF GAY PARTNERSHIPS IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES (2002) (analyzing the

historical path of increasing acceptance and legal rights for same-sex couples); see also
Kees Waaldijk, Same-Sex Partnership, International Protection, in MAX PLANCK
ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (Ruldiger Wolfrum ed., 2009)
(providing an overview of same-sex partnership law though the world). For a country-bycountry list of European rules related to same-sex marriage and partnerships, see ILGAEurope, Marriage and Partnership Rights for Same-Sex Partners: Country-by-Country,
http://www.ilga-europe.org/europe/issues/Igbt-families/marriage-and-partnershiprights-forsamesex-partners-countrybycountry (last visited Nov. 17, 2009).
19. See Kochenov, supra note 9, at 218; see also Dimitry Kochenov, Gay Rights in the
EU: A Long Way Forwardfor the Union of 27, 3 CROATIAN Y.B. EUR. L. & POL'Y 469 (2007)
[hereinafter Kochenov, Gay Rights in the EU] (discussing the evolution of gay rights in
the EU and providing a sketch of necessary developments to expand those rights).
20. See Waaldijk, supra note 18. The EU's attempts to promote gay rights protection
in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe during the pre-accession process that led
those countries to full membership of the EU were not very successful either. See Dimitry
Kochenov, Democracy and Human Rights-Not for Gay People?: EU Eastern Enlargement and
Its Impact on the Protection of the Rights of Sexual Minorities, 13 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REv. 459
(2007); see also Travis J. Langenkamp, FindingFundamentalFairness:Protectingthe Rights of
Homosexuals Under European Union Accession Law, 4 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 437, 459-60
(2003) (discussing the restriction of rights in Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary,
Lithuania, and Romania).
21. See, e.g., Spain Approves Gay Marriage Bill, BBC NEWS, Oct. 1, 2004,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3706414.stm (addressing the Catholic Church's
position that gay marriage is morally wrong and that marriage is by nature a
heterosexual institution); see also Charles J. Russo, Same-Sex Marriage and Public School
Curricula:PreservingParentalRights to Direct the Education of Their Children, 32 U. DAYrON
L. REv. 361 (2007). But see Victor C. Romero, An "Other" ChristianPerspective on Lawrence
v. Texas, 45J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 115 (2006).
22. See infra Part II.
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the necessary tools to deal with discrimination that gay citizens
suffer from in the most constructive way.
The focus lies, in particular, on the likely developments in
the EU that are bound to diminish the member states' ability to
undermine free movement of citizens in the Union by
discriminating against EU citizens on the basis of sex, which is
currently the norm in a situation when the member states are
seemingly free not to recognise the same-sex marriages and
unions legally concluded outside of their borders even in
situations where EU law is involved.
When moral exceptions are not available to the member
states to deviate from the free movement of persons principle of
EU law 23 and since public policy exceptions 24 should be narrowly
construed and have to be able to withstand strict levels of scrutiny
with regard to the soundness of their justifications, the member
states are bound to lose absolute control over the notion of
"family" where EU law is involved. 25 Thus, besides an exit option

23. Article 45(3)-(4) TFEU ("Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union")
(article 39(3)-(4) EC ("Treaty Establishing the European Community")) is mute about
such ground. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union art. 45, 2008 O.J. C 115/47, at 66 [hereinafter TFEU Treaty]; Consolidated
Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 39, 2006 O.J. C 321
E/37, at 51 [hereinafter EC Treaty].
All references in this Article to the to the Treaty Establishing the European
Community ("EC Treaty") and Treaty on the European Union ("TEU") use a parallel
citation format and provide numbering both before and after the entry into force of the
Treaty of Lisbon. While the Treaty of Lisbon, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. C 306/1, partially
renamed the treaties and renumbered all of their provisions entirely, the text of the
articles referred to in the published form of the treaties is largely left unchanged. The
EC Treaty was renamed the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
("TFEU"). While the TEU has kept its original name, for the purpose of clarity this
Article will refer to the original version as "TEU pre-Lisbon" and the updated version as
"TEU post-Lisbon." See generally Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European
Union, 2008 O.J. C 115/13 [hereinafter TEU post-Lisbon]; Consolidated Version of the
Treaty on European Union, 2006 O.J. C 321 E/5 [hereinafter TEU pre-Lisbon]. The
consolidated version of the treaties with the new numbering is available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/index.htm. The new, consolidated version of the
treaties entered into force on December 1, 2009, and contains a table of equivalences
between pre-Lisbon and post-Lisbon numberings.
24. See, e.g., Orfanopoulos & Oliveri v. Land Baden-Wforttemberg, Joined Cases C482 & C-493/01, [2004] E.C.R. 5257; Commission v. Belgium, Case 149/79, [1981]
E.C.R. 3881.
25. See Eugenia Caracciolo di Torella & Emily Reid, The Changing Shape of the
"EuropeanFamily" and Fundamental Rights, 27 EUR. L. REv. 80, 84 (2002). See generally
Eugenia Caracciolo di Torella, Under Construction: EU Family Law, 29 EUR. L. REV. 32
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which the European legal order already provides, a rudimentary
"entry option" is to be articulated, as the homophobic member
states will need to come up with justifications of their limitations
of the freedom of intimate association and will be failing to
prove, compellingly, the soundness of their policy. While, given
the logic of wholly internal situations that can still limit the rights
of EU citizens, 26 the member states cannot be required to change
their own family law, it is clear that their ability to deviate from
the recognition of less restrictive notions of family proliferating
from other member states will become negligible within the ever
28
7
growing scope ratione materiaeV of EU law.

The argument will proceed as follows. Following Part I, a
short outline of the importance of federalism for the
preservation of liberty, Part II will build on Koppelman's analysis
of the nature of sexual orientation discrimination as sex
discrimination 29. Part III will apply the reasoning of the first two
(2004) (discussing the extent to which the EU has developed a coherent body of
principles on family relation despite the absence of treaty provisions for this area).
26. The case law on reverse discrimination in the area of free movement is
abundant. See, e.g., Morson & Jhanjan v. Netherlands, Joined Cases 35 & 36/82, [1982]
E.C.R. 3723. For the fundamental critical analysis of the wholly-internal situations in EU
law of free movement of persons, see Alina Tryfonidou, Reverse Discriminationin Purely
Internal Situations: An Incongruity in a Citizens' Europe, 35 LEGAL ISSUES OF ECON.
INTEGRATION 43 (2008). See also Alina Tryfonidou, REVERSE DISCRIMINATION IN EC LAW

(2009); Niamh Nic Shuibhne, Free Movement of Persons and the Wholly Internal Rule: Time
to Move on?, 39 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 731 (2002).
27. See Schempp v. Finanzamt Mfinchen V, Case C-403/03, [2005] E.C.R. 6421,
22 ("[T]he situation of a national of a Member State who ... has not made use of the
right to freedom of movement cannot, for that reason alone, be assimilated to a purely
internal situation."); Carpenter v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, Case C-60/00,
[2002] E.C.R. 627 (explaining that the jurisdiction of the ECJ includes a member state's
refusal to grant a right of residence to a third-country national married to an EU citizen,
when the EU citizen resided in his country of nationality and regularly provided services
in other member states).
28. As far as the outcome of the argument of this Article is concerned, it will
coincide with Allison O'Neill's argument that the formulation by the ECJ of the
requirement for the recognition of same-sex marriages all over the Union is a necessary
step in application of the treaty's free movement provisions. See Allison R. O'Neill,
Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage in the European Community: The European Court ofJustice's
Ability to Dictate Social Policy, 37 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 199, 201 (2004). My reasoning,
however, differs significantly.
29. For a compelling analysis of this argument, see Koppelman, supra note 7. See
also Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling, Gender-Role
Stereotypes, and Legal Protectionfor Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 511, 631-650
(1992); Andrew Koppelman, The MiscegenationAnalogy: Sodomy Law as Sex Discrimination,
98 YALE LJ. 145, 154-64 (1988); Sylvia Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of
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Parts to the legal context of European integration, looking both
at its potential and the limitations which its practical use in the
European context is likely to face. Karst's approach to the
necessity for states to justify the legislation that follows the moral
choices of the majority impeding the freedom of intimate
association will become a starting point for the assessment
contained in this Part. The Part then outlines the near-future of
EU citizens' free movement law, which is bound to include the
notion of "family" in order to keep up with the promise of the
gender-blind wording of article 21(1) TFEU ("Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union") (article 18(1) EC ("Treaty
Establishing the European Community")). 30 An optimistic
conclusion will summarise the main arguments once again.
Both entry and exit options offered to gay citizens by
European federalism contribute to the liberty of EU citizens and
also participate in the slow, general evolution of the nature of
intimate association we have witnessed during the last 150 years.
It partly has to do with the changing function of marriage in
contemporary, liberal societies.
Historically, marriage played an important ideological role,
disadvantaging and subordinating women. 3 1 As societies change,
it becomes clear that the niche previously occupied by "family" as
a legal and social construct is on the verge of disappearing; "for
all relevant and appropriate societal purposes we do not need
marriage, per se, at all." 32 The role of marriage in legitimizing
children, cohabitation, or sexual intimacy-among numerous
others-has enormously diminished, directly affecting mutual
obligations of all individuals and overwhelmingly demonstrating

Gender,Wis. L. REv. 187, 188-96 (1988). Koppelman restated his argument in a number
of publications. See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Defending the Sex DiscriminationArgument
for Lesbian and Gay Rights: A Reply to Edward Stein, 49 UCLA L. REv. 519 (2001)
[hereinafter Koppelman, Defending].
30. "Every citizen of the Union shall have the right to move and reside freely within
the territory of the Member States, subject to the limitations and conditions laid down in
the Treaties and by the measures adopted to give them effect." TFEU Treaty, supra note
23, art. 21(1), 2008 O.J. C. 115, at 57; EC Treaty, supra note 23, art. 18(1), 2006 OJ. C
321 E, at 49.
31. See Martha Fineman, Masking Dependency: The Political Role of Family Rhetoric, 81
VA. L. REV. 2181 (1995) (arguing that continued adherence to an unrealistic and
unrepresentative set of assumptions about family affects the way U.S. citizens perceive
and attempt to solve persistent problems of poverty and social welfare).
32. Martha Fineman, Why Marriage?,9 VA.J. SOC. POL'Y& L. 239, 245 (2001).

2009]

GAYS AND EUROPEAN FEDERALISM

the hollowness of the elevated status which marriage used to
33
enjoy "in the hierarchy of models of human intimacy."
Moreover, it is clear that today a "[f]ormal associational status
plainly is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the
realization of the values of intimate association."3 4 Yet, it would
be unwise to announce the death of marriage as a legal status
and social institution; it is here to stay.
The fight for same-sex marriage recognition could be
perceived as strange, 35 if not the likely importance of this
institution also in the future. The main reasons behind the fight
for same-sex marriage are summarized excellently by Franke:
"the refusal to distribute this public benefit and status to samesex couples is motivated by and perpetuates both heterosexism
and homophobia." 36 Moreover, once a link between marriage
and citizenship is explored, it becomes clear that denying the
right to marry a partner of one's choice can also be viewed as "a
"cultural message that certain groups are not suited for full
citizenship." 37 Consequently, the potential contribution of the
EU federalism to the destruction of the illiberal, prejudicial
approach to marriage and gay rights is worth exploring, the fall
of marriage notwithstanding.
I.

FEDERALISM, LIBERTY, AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

Federalism contributes to freedom in at least two ways: by
providing a minimal rights denominator at the federal level
which is to be followed by all the states and-in the issues where
such denominator is either not available, or not sufficient-by
33. R.A. Lenhardt et al., Forty Years of Loving: Confronting Issues of Race, Sexuality,
and the Family in the Twenty-first Century, 76 FORDHAM L. REv. 2669, 2673 (2008).
34. Karst, supra note 1, at 647.
35. For the argument that marriage is a "problematic institution that betrays the
promise of both lesbian and gay liberation and radical feminism," see Nancy D. Polikoff,
We Will Get What We Ask for: Why Legalising Gay and Lesbian Marriage Will Not "Dismantle
the Legal Structure of Gender in Every Marriage,"79 VA. L. REV. 1535, 1536 (1993).
36. Katherine M. Franke, Longing for Loving, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2685, 2687
(2008).
37. Angela P. Harris, Loving Before and After the Law, 76 FORDHAM L. REv. 2821,
2823 (2008) (exploring the link between the right to marry and full citizenship). This is
so because "the legitimacy and respectability that law confers on marital couples
reinforces the illegitimacy and deviance of those whose sexual, intimate, and affective
commitments, if not merely contacts, lie in nonmarital contexts." Franke, supra note 36,
at 2689. See also the literature cited in id.
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providing an exit option for those who are unhappy in their
native state.
The CoE can be viewed in this context as the provider of the
most general common denominator of rights available in
Europe, while the EU is the guarantor of the exit option that it
granted to its citizens.18 Wherever you move in the EU, you are
always covered by important CoE rules, 39 including, especially,
the European Convention on Human Rights ("ECHR") 40 as
interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights in
Strasbourg. 41 All in all, however, the exit option becomes the
38. TFEU, supra note 23, art. 21, 2008 O.J. C 115, at 57; EC Treaty, supra note 23,
art. 18, 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 49.
39. This is so because all the member states of the EU are also members of the
Council of Europe ("CoE"). The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms ("ECHR") also impacts the EU. TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 23,
art. 6(2), 2008 O.J. C 115, at 19; TEU pre-Lisbon, supra note 23, art. 6(2), 2006 O.J. C
321 E, at 12; see also Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4,1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, amended by Protocol No. 11 to the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 4 November 1950,
Restructuring the Control Machinery Established Thereby, May 11, 1994, 2061 A-2889
U.N.T.S. 12 [hereinafter ECHR]. According to the case law of the ECJ, the ECHR
possesses "special significance" in the EU legal system, serving as a source of legal
principles for Union legal order. See, e.g., Kremzow v. Austria, Case C-299/95, [1997]
E.C.R. 2629,
14; Elliniki Radiophonia Til6orassi AE v. Pliroforissis, Case C-260/89,
[1991] E.C.R. 2925,
41; see also Coote v. Granada Hospitality Ltd., Case C-185/97,
[1998] E.C.R. 5199, It 21-23; Johnston v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster
Constabulary, Case 222/84, [1986] E.C.R. 1651,
18. Notwithstanding its importance as
a source of principles, the ECHR does not apply within the EU legal system directly. See
D.J. HARRIS ET AL., LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RiGHTS 28-29 (2d

ed. 2009). The Treaty of Lisbon amendments allow the Union to change the current
status quo by becoming a party to the ECHR. See TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 23, art.
6(2), 2008 O.J. C 115, at 19; Treaty of Lisbon, Protocol No. 8, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. C
306/1.
40. ECHR, supra note 39.
41. In the specific context of gay rights protection, the European Court of Human
Rights has taken many measures to promote crucial rights in Europe, ranging from
decriminalisation of consensual homosexual acts, see, e.g., Modinos v. Cyprus, 259 Eur.
Ct. H.R. 1 (1993); Norris v. Ireland, 142 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (1988); Dudgeon v. United
Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (1981), equalisation of the minimal ages of consent of
homosexual and heterosexual acts, see, e.g., Sutherland v. United Kingdom, App. No.
25186/94, 24 Eur. Comm'n. H.R. Dec. & Rep. 182 (1997), and the prohibition of
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in the military, see Lustig-Prean v.
United Kingdom, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. 601 (2001), to adoption and child custody rights of
homosexuals, see E.B. v. France, 47 Eur. Ct. H.R. 509, 509 (2008); Salgueiro da Silva
Mouta v. Portugal, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1055 (2001), nondiscrimination between unmarried
homosexual and heterosexual couples, see Karner v. Austria, 38 Eur. Ct. H.R. 528, 530,
537 (2003), and the protection of their freedom of association, see Byrzykowski v.
Poland, 46 Eur. Ct. H.R. 675 (2007).
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most important one in terms of empowering EU citizens, since
the EU, by its very nature, is not empowered to act in the
majority of fields, 42 and given that rules of the CoE are just as
basic as they are important.
It is clear that when a federal system is integrated to such an
extent that the local differences are negligible, the ability of such
a system to enhance liberty is likely to be negligible too. Indeed,
"removing borders loses much of its value if what is on the other
side is the same." 43 This point can also be proven with a simple
use of numbers:
For example, assume that there are only two states, with
equal populations of 100 each. Assume further that 70
percent of State A, and only 40 percent of State B, wish to
outlaw smoking in public buildings. The others are opposed.
If the decision is made on a national basis by a majority rule,
110 people will be pleased, and 90 displeased. If a separate
decision is made by majorities in each state, 130 will be
pleased and only 70 displeased. The level of satisfaction will
be still greater if the smokers in State A decide to move to
State B, and some anti-smokers in State B decide to move to
State A.

44

Thus when the political or legal regimes across an internal
border differ, federalism turns into an asset for the promotion of
liberty. Such liberty is not an apodictic ideal of the totalitarian
states, but is rooted in the tandem of diversity and mobility.
Extreme interpretations of this facet of federalism give the exit
option more importance than political participation: "a
sufficiently decentralized regime with full mobility could
perfectly satisfy each person's preferences even with no voting at
all." 45 Practically, individual freedoms of citizens moving freely

42. TEU Post-Lisbon, supra note 23, art. 5(2), 2008 O.J. C 115, at 18 ("[T]he
Union shall act only within the limits of the competences conferred upon it by the
Member States in the Treaties to attain the objectives set out therein."); EC Treaty, supra
note 23, art. 5, 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 46 (The Union can only act "within the limits of the
powers conferred upon it by [the EC Treaty] and of the objectives assigned to it
therein.").
43. GARETH T. DAVIES, A TIME TO MOURN-How I LEARNED TO STOP WORRYING

AND QUITE LIKE THE EUROPEAN UNION 18 (2008).
44. Michael McConnel, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1484, 1494 (1987) (reviewing RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN
(1987)).
45. Id. at 1494 n.37.
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are potentially amplified since "state-by-state variation leaves
open the possibility to each individual of choosing to avoid
repression by leaving the repressive jurisdiction." 46 This is an
effective way to deal with what Madison saw as the greatest
potential threat to individual liberty, the tyranny of the
majority. 47 Although not a panacea, the exit option provided by
federalism should not be underestimated.
The ability of the EU to advance liberty through federalism
is extremely rich, as the member states vary greatly. Only a
marginal part of legal regulation has been harmonised, allowing
citizens to benefit from the existing variations from one member
state to another. These variations are particularly important with
regard to the positions that the member states take on moral
issues, such as abortion, same-sex marriage, divorce, and the like.
The citizens thus have infinitely more possibilities to choose the
legal regime that suits them best by moving from one member
state to another, compared with unitary systems, whereby moving
one can find little more than a change in weather. The situation
of EU citizens thus approaches that of their U.S. counterparts.
"Today, the lesbian who finds herself in Utah, like the gun lover
who lives in Washington, D.C., and the gambler in Pennsylvania,
need only cross the state border to be free of constraining
49
rules." 48 Similarly, in Europe a Latvian of Russian descent can
move to Spain, just like a Greek gay couple can, trading the lack
of acceptance to the possibility of normal life.
Besides an assumption that the states are self-governing and
that there are important differences between them in terms of
regulation of some issues of potential moral disagreement, in
order to provide citizens with an "exit option" able to have farreaching effects on their freedom, three features of the federal
system that would limit the states themselves are absolutely

46. Kreimer, supra note 5, at 71.
47. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison) (introducing the concept of
"tyranny of the majority").
48. Kreimer, supra note 5, at 72.
49. On the Russian minority in Latvia, see Gulara Guliyeva, Lost in Transition:
Russian-Speaking Non-Citizens in Latvia and the Protection of Minority Rights in the European
Union, 33 EUR. L. REV. 843 (2008). See generally Dimitry Kochenov, A Summay of
Contradictions:An Outline of the EU's Main Internal and External Approaches to Ethnic
Minority Protection, 31 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1 (2008) (discussing ethnic minority
protection in the EU).
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crucial. Agreeing with Kreimer, these should include the free
movement right granted to citizens, equality between newcomers
and native citizens in the new state of residence, and territoriallylimited state jurisdictions. 50 Only when all the three elements are
in place is it possible to talk about the exit option within the
federal systems that would provide an opportunity to safeguard
liberty for the citizens. All the three are now found both in the
United States and in the EU.
In the United States, freedom of travel, 5' which includes the
freedom from being punished in any way whatsoever for leaving
one's native state, 52 and equality among citizens 53 are core
elements of the constitutional system. The same applies to the
third component outlined: the Supreme Court is clear about the
fact that " [a] State does not acquire power of supervision over
the internal affairs of another State merely because the welfare
and health of its own citizens may be affected when they travel to
that State . . . .54
Although the EU citizenship is merely an ius tractum status
dependent on the nationalities of the member states, 55 it is
nevertheless a status grounded in EU law, bringing with it a set of
rights specific to the EU legal order. 56 The most important of
these are nondiscrimination on the basis of nationality 5 7 -in the
50. Kreimer, supra note 5, at 73.
51. See Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 178 (1941). The right of interstate
travel is viewed as a freedom that "occupies a position fundamental to the concept of
[the] Federal Union." United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966); see also Mem'l
Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 254-55 (1974) (addressing freedom of travel
within the context of federalism); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 338 (1972) (same);
Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 106 (1971) (same).
(discussing the
52. See Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. 35, 48-49 (1897)
constitutionality of taxing citizens of Nevada for departing from the state); see also
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 (1969) (concerning durational residency
requirements for welfare entitlements), overruled in part by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.
651 (1974).
53. SeeU.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl.1 ("The Citizens of each state shall be entitled to
all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States."); see also Saenz v. Roe, 526
U.S. 489, 500-03 (1999) (discussing the effects of the Privileges and Immunities Clause
on newly arrived citizens in a state).
54. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 824 (1975).
55. See Kochenov, supra note 9, at 181.
56. See, e.g., id. at 193-206.
57. See generally GARETH DAVIES, NATIONALITY DISCRIMINATION IN THE EUROPEAN
INTERNAL MARKET (2003) (highlighting the relationship between the principle of
nondiscrimination based on nationality and the right to free movement); Astrid Epiney,

168

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 33:156

words of Davies, de facto "abolishing" the nationalities of the
member states58-and free movement. 59 The latter does not only
include a right to travel around the EU, but also a right to settle
anywhere you like with your family, take up employment, 60 and to
be treated exactly the same way as the natives of your new
member state of residence are treated. 6' Ability to change one's
member state of residence, and nondiscrimination on the basis
of nationality, are thus the core fights of citizenship stemming
from the EU legal order. Additionally, the member states are
prohibited from creating obstacles to free movement of citizens
that would discourage their own nationals to move to other
member states. 62 The first two of Kreimer's components of
federalism necessary to enable effective exit option are thus in
place. The third is part of the EU system too: the member states
are Herren der Vertrdge, sovereign states also under international
law, 63 so their jurisdiction is most often limited to their own
territory. 64 Applied to the situation of the gay communities in the
member states the "exit option" of European federalism already
provides a viable alternative to life in potentially homophobic
societies, such as Poland, Ireland, or Latvia, as moving to the
Netherlands or Sweden is a protected EU citizenship right.

The Scope of Article 12 EC: Some Remarks on the Influence ofEuropean Citizenship, 13 EUR. L.J.
611, 612 n.4 (2007) (listing the ECJ's most recent and relevant case law for the
interpretation of article 12 of the EC Treaty (article 18 of TFEU)).
58. Gareth Davies, "Any Place I HangMy Hat?" or: Residence Is the New Nationality, 11
EUR. LJ. 43, 55 (2005).
59. TFEU, supra note 23, art. 21, 2008 O.J. C 115, at 57; EC Treaty, supra note 23,
art. 18, 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 49.
60. See Kochenov, supra note 9, at 183.
61. See Council Directive No. 2004/38, art. 24, 2004 O.J. L 158/77, at 112.
62. See Francis G. Jacobs, Citizenship of the European Union-A Legal Analysis, 13 EUR.
L.J. 591, 596-98 (2007); see also infra note 76 and accompanying text.
63. Sovereignty of the member states and supranationality of the Union produce
an interesting mix. See Dimitry Kochenov, The Case of the EC: Peaceful Coexistence of an
Ever Powerful Community and Sovereign Member States?, in L'UNION EUROPtENNE ET LA
GOUVERNANCE 243 (Francis Snyder ed., 2003) (considering member state sovereignty in
the European Community ("EC")).
64. There exist examples to the contrary, which are not easily accepted by the
member states. See, e.g., Massimo Fichera, The European Arrest Warrant and the Sovereign
State: A Marriage of Convenience?, 15 EUR. L.J. 70 (2009) (discussing the saga of the
European arrest warrant and the tension between state sovereignty and the power of
European institutions).
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It is clear that, as Kreimer also underscores, "the exit option
is no panacea." 65 A guarantee of a viable degree of legal unity of
the Union is indispensable: member states cannot specialize in
accepting only citizens adhering to certain ideologies and rules
of morality, which can potentially result in the fragmentation of
the Union. 66 Moreover, moving across internal borders can often
be difficult. In the EU, where citizenship rights are usually
connected with the personal and financial situation of the citizen
concerned, 67 not merely the status of citizenship, it can even be

impossible in some cases. In one example, EU citizens without
work or independent means are not entitled to the enjoyment of
a full-fledged free movement right and can only stay in a member68
state other than their own for a period of three months.
Notwithstanding the case law of the European Court of Justice
("ECJ"), narrowing down such limitations of the free movement
right, 69 as the law stands at the moment, not all EU citizens can
actually benefit from the right which article 21 TFEU (article 18
EC) provides.
Given that the "exit option" is unable to solve all the
problems and is even not always available in practice, a certain
degree of legal convergence with regard to the most important
issues, particularly related to human rights, is needed. Such

65. Kreimer, supra note 5, at 72.
66. This loosely compares to the U.S. principle that the states are not free to
choose their citizens. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 510-11 (1999) ("The States, however,
do not have any right to select their citizens.").
67. See Kochenov, supra note 9, at 234-37 (listing the factors affecting the
enjoyment of EU citizenship rights).
68. Workers, able to travel around the EU and stay in any of the member states as
long as it pleases them, enjoy much better protection than the European citizens
experiencing health problems and economic hardship, because all persons not falling
within the EU definition of a worker should, according to the general rule, be covered
by sickness insurance and have sufficient resources in order to benefit from the right "of
residence on the territory of another [member state] for a period of longer than three
months." Council Directive No. 2004/38, art. 7(1), 2004 O.J. L 158/77, at 93. Jobseekers can stay longer. See The Queen v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal ex parte
21 (holding that a national of one
Antonissen, Case C-292/89, [1991] E.C.R. 741,
member state who proves that he is "continuing to seek employment and that he has
genuine chances of being engaged" in another member state cannot be forced to
leave).
69. See, e.g., In re Bidar, Case C-209/03, [2005] E.C.R. 2119; Trojani v. Centre
public d'aide sociale de Bruxelles, Case C-456/02, [2004] E.C.R. 7573; H. de Waele,
Europees burgerschap en studiefinanciering: Nieuwe rechten, nieuwe beperkingen na het arrest
Bidar, 2005 (6) NEDERLANDS TIJDSCHRiFr VOOR EUROPEES RECHT 122 (2005).
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convergence can theoretically come in three ways: via full
harmonization, via the introduction of European terminology to
be applied within the material scope of EU law, or via the federal
requirement of recognition of national rules even outside the
member states in which such rules were initially adopted. In all
these cases, deviations from the rules are to be strictly checked
against the principles of federal (EU) law. Yet another way stems
directly from the availability of the pan-European human rights
minimum introduced by the CoE, reinforcing the overall
framework of human rights protection.
While harmonization is always an option, 70 mutual
recognition enforced by EU institutions can be more attractive in
the European legal setting. Following several unsuccessful
attempts to reform the treaties, 71 it becomes clear that the
introduction of new areas of harmonization, especially dealing
with the issues of deep moral disagreement between the member
states, is highly unlikely at the moment. Consequently, the
treaties currently in force need to be optimally used in order to
bring about change without full harmonisation. This can be done
using two avenues already mentioned: either via the formulation
of European legal notions for some ambiguous terms to be used

70. If needed, the treaties can be changed if they do not permit such
harmonization. See TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 23, art. 48, 2008 OJ. C 115, at 41-43;
TEU pre-Lisbon, supra note 23, art. 48, 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 34 (permitting member
states to amend treaties). This has happened on numerous occasions. See, e.g., Treaty of
Amsterdam, art. 2(7), 1997 O.J. C 340/1, at 26 (amending the TEU, and authorizing
member states to "combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion
or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation").
71. See, e.g., KRISTIN ARCHICK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE EUROPEAN UNION'S
REFORM
PROCESS:
THE
LISBON
TREATY
(2008),
available
at
http://italy.usembassy.gov/pdf/other/RS21618.pdf
(explaining how Irish voters
rejected the Lisbon Treaty, which sought to reform the EU's governing institutions);
Thomas Christiansen, The EU Treaty Reform Process Since 2000: The Highs and Lows of
Constitutionalising the European Union, EIPASCOPE (Eur. Inst. of Pub. Admin.,
Maastricht), 2008 (No. 1), at 39. But see Press Release, Swedish Presidency of the
European Union, Final Piece of the Puzzle in Place (Nov. 3, 2009),
http://www.se2009.eu/en/meetingsnews/2009/11/3/final-piece-of the-puzzle in_
place (announcing that the Lisbon Treaty will enter into force on December 1, 2009).
For an analysis of the drafting process for the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for
Europe and subsequent developments, see GENESIS AND DESTINY OF THE EUROPEAN
CONSTITUTION (Giuliano Amato et al. eds., 2007).
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within the scope ratione materiae of EU law (i.e. "family"), 72 or
through the formulation of the principle of unconditional
recognition of the national understanding of such terms even
outside the borders of the member states where they were
formulated.
The ECJ is in the position to choose either way.
Consequently, the EU legal system is likely to offer more than a
simple "exit option", but also what will be called an "entry
option", i.e., a legal possibility to enter a member state other
than your own and carry the rules of your old member state with
you. The "entry option" thus constitutes a clear deviation from
Kreimer's third principle, limiting the territorial jurisdictions of
the member states. This is so, since a number of EU citizens who
exercised their rights to move to another member state can be
better off in their new member state of residence because the law
of the first member state would still apply to them. 73 Such
situations, when mandated by EU law would be outside the realm
of private law: the functioning of the "entry option" is a direct
consequence of the way that EU law functions vis-4-vis national
law of the member states. This entry option is the emanation of
the specific nature of European federalism.
The most important difference between EU and U.S.
federalism with implications for the freedom of intimate
74
association is the goal-oriented nature of EU competences,
disallowing the member states from putting up barriers on the
way of free movement of persons. Indeed, in its importance, free
movement in Europe can be compared with freedom of speech
in the U.S. hierarchy of constitutional values. Consequently, the
obligations lying on the member states to accept the nationals of
other member states should they wish to move in and stay
potentially go further than the U.S. example, as EU law working

72. The ECJ has a rich history of articulating EU legal terminology-for example,
"worker" or "the court or tribunal of the Member States"-much broader than the
national definitions available in the legal systems of the member states.
73. Such situations can be criticised as undermining the principle of equality
among European citizens. See, e.g., Gareth Davies, Services, Citizenship and the Country of
Origin Principle (Europa Institute, Mitchell Working Paper Series 2/2007); Tryfonidou,
supra note 26, at 43; Kochenov, supra note 9, at 237.
74. For a compelling analysis of EU competences, see Armin von Bogdandy &
Jfirgen Bast, The European Union's Vertical Order of Competences: The Current Law and
ProposalsforIts Reform, 39 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 227 (2002).
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through the principles of supremacy and direct effect (where
applicable) is likely to overrule any national law able to have a
negative impact on the exercise of the free movement right. In a
way, this is comparable to the U.S. principle that the states are
not able "to select their citizens," 75 but goes somewhat further, as
any law, even potentially not discriminating on the basis of
nationality, can be struck down if it puts a burden on the exercise
of free movement fights by EU citizens. 76 So the potential "entry
option" acquires its shape.
II. SEXUAL ORIENTATIONDISCRIMINATION OR SEX
DISCRIMINATION?
Sex discrimination is usually easy to spot, as it burdens one
of the sexes. If John is refused enrolment at a nursery school or if
Mary earns less than Edward both doing the same job, direct sex
discrimination is obvious. With gay persons, sex discrimination is
seemingly not as straightforward, which is probably why a
different prohibited ground of discrimination is often preferred
in such cases: discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.
At a closer look, however, it is apparent that often very simple sex
discrimination
gets
rebranded
as
sexual
orientation
discrimination once a person belonging to sexual minorities is
involved.

75. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 511 (1999).
76. See, e.g., Morgan v. K61n & Bucher v. Dfiren, Joined Cases C-1I & C-12/06,
[2007] E.C.R. 9161 (determining that a student studying in another member state is
entitled to the same benefits and rights provided by that member state to its own
citizens); Schwarz v. Gladbach, Case C-76/05, [2007] E.C.R. 6849 (striking down
legislation that prevents citizens of one member state from receiving a tax deduction for
tuition paid to school in another member state); Tas-Hagen v. Raadskamer WUBO van
de Pensioen- en Uitkeringsraad, Case C-192/05, [2006] E.C.R. 10451 (concluding that a
member state cannot withhold benefits from its citizens despite the citizen having
residence in another member state at the time that the benefits application was made).
The main idea of this groundbreaking case law is summarised by Advocate General
Jacobs in Pusa with great clarity. Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Pusa v.
Vakuutusyhti6, Case C-224/02, [2004] E.C.R. 5763, 1 22 ("[S]ubject to the limits set out
in Article 18 [EC; article 21 TFEU] itself, no unjustified burden may be imposed on any
citizen of the European Union seeking to exercise the right to freedom of movement or
residence. Provided that such a burden can be shown, it is immaterial whether the
burden affects nationals of other Member States more significantly than those of the
State imposing it."); see also Jacobs, supra note 62, at 596-98; Editorial, Two-Speed
European Citizenship? Can the Lisbon Treaty Help Close the Gap ? 45 COMMON MKT. L. REv.
1, 1-2 (2008).
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The exact type of discrimination in question invoked in
each concrete case is of overwhelming importance, as the level to
which the law tolerates discrimination on different grounds can
also differ (and it almost always does). So while sex
discrimination is virtually prohibited in the EU, 77 discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation is a rather new addition to the
treaties. This ground was mentioned for the first time only in
article 19 TFEU (article 13 EC), introduced by the Treaty of
Amsterdam. 78 In other words, before the Amsterdam amendment
and the passage of the relevant directive, gay people in the EU
did not have a specific prohibited ground of discrimination to
rely on, 79 should discrimination occur.80 Even now, with
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation outlawed by the
treaties and secondary legislation,8 1 the prohibition of such
77. Nondiscrimination on the basis of sex has been recognised by the ECJ as one of
the fundamental principles of EU law. See Defrenne v. Socidt6 anonyme belge de
12 (stating that the
navigation adrienne Sabena, Case 43/75, [1976] E.C.R. 455,
"principle of equal pay forms part of the foundations of the Community" and there
should be equal pay for equal work with no distinction based on sex). In Deutsche
Telekom AG v. Schro1der, the court held that the economic aims of the TFEU's sex equality
provisions in article 157 (article 141 EC) is "secondary to the social aim pursued ...
which constitutes the expression of a fundamental human right." Deutsche Telekom AG
57; see also SUSANNE BURRI & SACHA
v. Schr6der, Case C-50/96, [2000] E.C.R. 743,
PRECHAL, EU GENDER EQUALITY LAW 3-4 (2008); Ann Humhauser-Henning, EU Sex
Equality Law Post-Amsterdam, in EQUALITY LAW IN AN ENLARGED EUROPEAN UNION:
UNDERSTANDING THE ARTICLE 13 DIRECTIVES 145 (Helen Meenan ed., 2007).
78. Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 70, art. 2(7).
79. Before the Treaty of Amsterdam was ratified, Mr. Flynn confirmed on behalf of
the commission, "at present the Treaty on European Union does not confer specific
powers on the institutions to eradicate discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation."
Written Question No. 2224/96, 1996 O.J. C 365, at 95; see also Written Question No.
2134/83, 1984 O.J. C 152, at 25 (stating that the European Council does not have the
power to curtail sexual discrimination); Written Question No. 2133/83, 1984 O.J. C 173,
at 9 (same).
80. While a number of the member states outlawed sexual-orientation
discrimination at the national level before the Treaty of Amsterdam was ratified, many
national legal systems in the EU needed to introduce a prohibition of such
discrimination for the first time only as a consequence of the obligation to implement
the directive. These states included Austria, Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal,
and the United Kingdom. See Kees Waaldijk, Legislation in Fifteen EU Member States
Against Sexual Orientation Discrimination in Employment: The Implementation of Directive
2000/78/EC,in THE GAYS' AND LESBIANS' RIGHTS IN AN ENLARGED EUROPEAN UNION 17,

23 (Anne Weyembergh & Sinziana Carstocea eds., 2006).
81. See Council Directive No. 2000/78, 2000 O.J. L 303/16. For an analysis, see
Dagmar Schiek, A New Framework on Equal Treatment of Persons in EC Law?, 8 EUR. L.J.
290 (2002); see also B. Koopman, De bijzondere inkadering van de Algemene Kaderrichtlijn,5
NEDERLANDS TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR EUROPEES RECHT 126 (2001).
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discrimination can be activated in a narrower array of cases,
compared with sex discrimination, which has been outlawed
from the time of the first steps of integration.8 2 A worrisome
hierarchy of different grounds of discrimination came to be
created in the EU, 83 when the prohibition of discrimination on
the basis of sex is much more far-reaching, applying to more
situations than discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation,
which is only outlawed in work and work-related relationships.8 4
The choice of a prohibited ground of discrimination can thus
have direct implications on the likelihood of success of a
discrimination claim.
Consequently, answering a simple question of which
prohibited ground of discrimination to use in each particular
case is extremely important. The answer does not always seem
obvious to the courts. The ECJ provides an excellent example of
confusion in this regard. Deciding all the cases involving
transsexuals on the sex discrimination grounds, 85 once gay rights
are in sight, the court automatically switches the prohibited
ground of discrimination from sex to sexual orientation, ruining
the scholarly predictions 86 and departing from Advocate General
Elmer's opinion arguing on the basis of sex discrimination. 87 This
is not in any way logically mandated, since a fact that a gay person
is involved in the case should not automatically mean that sex is
disqualified as a prohibited ground of discrimination, although
this is what the ECJ seems to suggest by its reasoning.

82. See TFEU, supra note 23, art. 157, 2008 O.J. C 115, at 117-18; EC Treaty, supra
note 23, art. 141, 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 110 (in terms of "equal pay for equal work" and
then as a general principle of EU law); see also Helen Meenan, Introduction to EQUALITY
LAW IN AN ENLARGED EUROPEAN UNION: UNDERSTANDING THE ARTICLE 13 DIRECTIVES 3

(Helen Meenan ed., 2007).
83. For an analysis, see Lisa Waddington & Mark Bell, More Equal than Others:
Distinguishing European Union Equality Directives, 38 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 587, 588
(2001).
84. Council Directive No. 2000/78/EC, art. 3(1), 2000 O.J. L 303/16, at 19.
85. See Richards v. Sect'y of State for Work & Pensions, Case C-423/04, [2006]
E.C.R. 3585, 1 1; KB. v. Nat'l Health Serv. Pensions Agency, Case C-117/01, [2004]
E.C.R. 541, It 6-7; P. v. S., Case C-13/94, [1996] E.C.R. 2143, 112.
86. See, e.g., Paul L. Spackman, Grant v. South-West Trains: Equality for Same-Sex
Partnersin the European Community, 12 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1063 (1997) (written
before Grant was decided).
87. See Opinion of Advocate General Elmer, Grant v. South-West Trains Ltd., Case
249/96, [1998] E.C.R. 621, 1 16 (-IT]he [EC] Treaty [is] precluding forms of
discrimination against employees based exclusively, or essentially, on gender.")
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In fact, it seems that the very difference between sex
discrimination and sexual orientation discrimination is often far
from being a helpful logical tool in dealing with discrimination
cases. Often invocation of sex orientation discrimination simply
means that the court interprets the notion of sex discrimination
in an unjustifiably narrow way. The reasons for such
misunderstanding are unknown to the author and are beyond
the scope of this Article, lying anywhere from the homophobic
bench to a genuinely bizarre vision of sex espoused by the
88
court.
What is clear, however, is that, whatever underlying reasons
the court had, the approach "does the European Court of Justice
little credit as a constitutional court." 89 Grant v. South-West Trains
Ltd.90 is the clearest example of the court's strange approach.
Greatly criticized in literature, 91 it is yet to be overruled; the court
still refuses to apply sex discrimination in cases involving a
homosexual in which only the sex of the person involved triggers
discrimination, following its redundant Grant reasoning. In
justifying its stance, the court largely hides behind two far from
convincing justifications. The first is concerned with its
"unwillingness" to enlarge the scope ratione materiae of EU law

88. There are more practical explanations available in the literature relating to the
costs of guaranteeing equality as well as political considerations affecting the court's
judgement. See, e.g., Eugenia Caracciolo di Torella & Annick Masselot, Under
Construction: EU Family Law, 29 EUR. L. REV. 32, 42 (2004) (discussing financial
considerations); Mark Bell, Shifting Conceptions of Sexual Discrimination at the Court of
Justice: From P. v. S. to Grantv. SWT,5 EUR. L.J. 63, 74-77 (1999) (discussing political and
moral considerations).
89. Nicholas Bamforth, Sexual Orientation Discrimination After Grant v. South-West
Trains, 63 MOD. L. REv. 694, 720 (2000).
90. Case C-249/96, [1998] E.C.R. 621.
91. See, e.g., Bamforth, supra note 89, at 720; Katell Bethou & Annick Masselot, La
CJCE et les couples homosexuelles, 12 DROIT SOC. 1034 (1998); Iris Canor, Equality for
Lesbians and Gay Men in the European Community Legal Order-"They Shall Be Male and
Female"?, 7 MAASTRICHT J. OF EUR. & COMP. L. 273 (2000); Bruce Carolan, Judicial
Impediments to LegislatingEquality for Same-Sex Couples in the European Union, 40 TULSA L.
REV. 527, 529-30 (2005); Andrew Koppelman, The Miscegenation Analogy in Europe, or,
Lisa Grant Meets Adolf Hitler, in LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS: A
STUDY OF NATIONAL, EUROPEAN, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 623 (Robert Wintermute &
Andenes eds., 2001); Adrian Williams, An Evaluation of the Historical Development of the
JudicialApproach to Affording Employees ProtectionAgainst Discriminationon the Basis of Their
Sexual Orientation,25 BUS. L. REV. 32, 34-35 (2004). The only analysis to date that is
somewhat court-friendly is contained in Christa Tobler, Kroniek: Discriminatieop grond
van geslacht, NEDERLANDS TIJDSCHRIF VOOR EUROPEES RECHT 74, 78-79 (1998).
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without an explicit legislative mandate 92-this is strange news for
those at least a little bit familiar with the court's activism that
eventually led to the very creation of the EU legal order.93 The
second is rooted in the constitutional traditions of member states
that the court used in Gran94 in order to deny rights just as freely
as it first invoked them to start its own human rights protection
jurisprudence from scratch. 95 To say that the constitutional
traditions of the member states prohibit outlawing discrimination
on the basis of sex is simply wrong. 96
Discrimination against homosexuals burdens both sexes,
instead of just one. "The fact that the burdened class is not
limited simply to all the members of exactly one sex reinforces
the superficial appeal of the single-standard counterargument
and its claim that discrimination against same-sex couples or
lesbian and gay men embodies no sex-based classification at
all." 97 The sex nature of the discrimination in question thus gets
masked by the fact that it applies to both sexes. Clark's analogy
with access to certain types of employment is very useful to
illustrate the problems inherent in such reasoning. Indeed, if it is
contended that women are not entitled to occupy positions
reserved to men and men are not entitled to positions reserved

92. Grant, [1998] E.C.R. 621, 1 35-36.
93. See Flaminio Costa v. ENEL, Case 6/64, [1964] E.C.R. 585, 3; N.V. Algemene
Transport en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie
der Belastingen, Case 26/62, [1963] E.C.R. 1, I.B; see also Bruno de Witte, Direct Effect,
Supremacy, and the Nature of the Legal Order, in THE EVOLUTION OF EU LAW 177 (Paul
Craig and Grdinne de Bfirca eds., 1999).
94. [1998] E.C.R. 621, 32.
95. See, e.g., J. Nold, Kohlen-und Baustoffgrop3handlung v. Commission, Case 4/73,
[1974] E.C.R. 491,
13; Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einffhr-und
Vorratsstelle ffir Getreide und Futtermittel, Case 11/70, [1970] E.C.R. 1125,
4;
Stauder v. City of Ulm-Sozialamt, Case 29/69, [1969] E.C.R. 419,
7. For the whole
story, see, for example, HENRY G. SCHERMERS & DENIS F. WAELBROEK, JUDICIAL
PROTECTION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 38-46 (6th ed. 2001). See alsoJoseph R. Wetzel,
Improving FundamentalRights Protection in the European Union: Resolving the Conflict and
Confusion Between the Luxembourg and StrasbourgCourts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 2823, 2834-

37 (2003).
96. To do justice to the ECJ, the court did not state this directly. However, should
the facts in Grant be viewed through the prism of P. v. S., Case C-13/94, [1996] E.C.R
2143, as the learned Advocate General suggested, reliance on the constitutional
traditions of the member states would result in exactly this kind of statement.
97. Stephen Clark, Same-Sex but Equal: Reforming the Miscegenation Analogy, 34
RUTGERS L.J. 107, 123 (2002).
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to women, sex discrimination seemingly ceases to apply.9 8
However, while in the case of access to employment we sense that
there might be a logical inconsistency, with same-sex couples it is
not always the case, making the courts deliver opinions like the
ECJ in Grant.
Looking beyond the simple reality that sex discrimination
can and does affect both sexes, it becomes clear that sexual
orientation discrimination is in fact sex discrimination. 99
Koppelman is one of the first scholars who started advocating this
seemingly obvious point of view, coming up with an argument
which is as simple as it is persuasive. It can be reduced, as Clark
has done, to the following syllogism: "'(1) Laws that make
people's rights depend on their sex are sex-based classifications.
(2) Laws that discriminate against gay people are laws that make
people's rights depend on their sex.... Therefore, (3) Laws that
discriminate against gay people are sex-based classifications." 100
IfJane is fired for kissing Masha and Mark would not be, it is
obvious that if Jane were a man, she would not be fired. If
Jacques cannot marry Mark, but marrying Jane is ok, it is only
Jacques' sex that disqualifies him. If sex is the only factor
bringing discrimination, we are dealing with a sex-based
classification and need to treat the situation as an instance of
prohibited
sex
discrimination,
not sexual
orientation
discrimination.
Analogy between sex discrimination negatively affecting gay
men and lesbian women and race discrimination affecting
people belonging to different races is a very informative one.1 0'
In a series of now-obsolete cases, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld
the prohibition of miscegenation on the ground that the
prohibition concerned both the white race and the black race (a
white woman could not spend a night with a black man just as a
black woman could not spend a night with a white man). In Pace
v. Alabama the Court held that, because both races were affected

98. See id. at 144.
99. See Koppelman, supra note 7; see also Clark, supra note 97, at 115-119.
100. Clark, supra note 97, at 118-19 (quoting ANDREW KOPPELMAN, THE GAY
RIGHTS QUESTION IN CONTEMPORARYAMERICAN LAW 53-54 (2002)).
101. For the application of this analogy within the European context see
Koppelman, Defending, supra note 29, at 538 n.9.
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equally, there was no race discrimination.1 0 2 The logical flaw
resulting in a "true perversion of the common-sense notion of
equality" ° is apparent here. Consequently, in the landmark
cases of McLaughlin v. Florida'0 4 and Loving v. Virginia °5 the
Supreme Court outlawed antimiscegenation
statutes as
0
6
discriminatory on the basis of race.
As applied to same-sex
couples, the logic of Loving is simple: stating that lesbians are not
discriminated against because they have as many rights as gay
men is directly discriminatory on the basis of sex-a
discrimination the ECJ did not have the courage (common
07
sense) to see in Grant.1
A number of scholars, including Karst himself, viewed the
sex discrimination argument as simplistic, doubting the
applicability
of
the
miscegenation
parallel,
as
the
antimiscegenation
laws,
as
it
was
submitted,
were
unconstitutional not so much because they discriminated on the
basis of race, but because they promoted white supremacy. 0 8 As
Clark explained, such an argument mixes two lines of reasoning,
one being concerned with the issue of discrimination, another
with the degree of scrutiny applied. 10 9 Virginia lost in Loving not
merely because of an existence of a race-based classification, but
because the justifications for antimiscegenation it provided could
not meet the standard of scrutiny required. This standard, in
turn, was set high precisely because antimiscegenation legislation
was aiming to promote white supremacy." 0 With regard to sex

102. 106 U.S. 583 (1883) (upholding laws on equal protection grounds), overruled
inpart by McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
103. Bruce Carolan, Rights of Sexual Minorities in Ireland and Europe: Rhetoric Versus
Reality, 19 DICK.J. INT'L L. 387, 405 (2001).
104. 379 U.S. at 184.
105. 288 U.S. 1 (1967).
106. The Court reasoned that an antimiscegenation law "treats the interracial
couple.., differently than it does any other couple." McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 188.
107. In Grant, the ECJ stated, "Since the condition imposed by the undertaking's
regulations applies in the same way to female and male workers, it cannot be regarded
as constituting discrimination directly based on sex." Grant v. South-West Trains Ltd.,
Case C-249/96, [1998] E.C.R. 621, 28.
108. See Karst, supra note 1, at 683-84.
109. See Clark, supranote 97, at 118, 146-47.
110. The Supreme Court determined that "[t]here is patently no legitimate
overriding purpose independent of invidious racial discrimination which justifies this
classification. The fact that Virginia prohibits only interracial marriages involving white
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discrimination it is possible to appeal to the freedom of intimate
can be severely undermined once
association which
of sex is a norm, in order to argue for
basis
discriminating on the
the same or at least similar standard of scrutiny as in the race
discrimination cases.
It is also possible to make another argument: that genderrole stereotyping and same-sex marriage prohibitions are directly
connected with male supremacy"' and the perpetuation of
heteronormative society, 1 2 necessarily connected with an idea of
sex-gender purity. 113 Analogy to miscegenation is instrumental
here again because both antimiscegenation legislation and the
prohibitions for gay people to marry, adopt children, and the like
are undermining the vision of the world limited to binary
divisions. Still now, when the advances in science demonstrate
how difficult establishing a "sex" can be, 114 to say nothing of
gender identity of a person, "our laws and culture continue to
15
think about sex-gender in essentialised and binary ways."
approached the
Agreeing with Ball, who masterfully
miscegenation analogy from the parentage stand-point,
one of the reasons why same-sex marriage is so threatening
to so many is that the raising of children by same-sex couples
blurs the boundaries of seemingly preexisting and static
sex/gender categories in the same way that the progeny of
interracial unions blur seemingly preexisting and static racial
categories.116
It is submitted that the sexual discrimination argument,
applied to discrimination negatively affecting sexual minorities, is
a very powerful instrument to deal with injustice. Yet, the ECJ
never moved to include gays within its scope, despite dozens of
years of prohibition against sex discrimination in the EU. While

persons demonstrates that the racial classifications must stand on their own justification,
as measures designed to maintain White Supremacy." Loving, 288 U.S. at 11.
111. See Cass R. Sunstein, Homosexuality and the Constitution, 70 IND. L.J. 1, 20-21
(1994).
112. See Franke, supra note 36, at 2687.
113. See Carlos A. Ball, The Blurring of the Lines: Children and Bans on Interracial
Unions and Same-Sex Marriages,76 FORDHAM L. REv. 2733, 2756 (2008).
114. For a discussion of this, see Julie A. Greenberg, Defining Male and Female:
Intersexuality and the Collision Between Law and Biology, 41 ARiz. L. REv. 265 (1999).
115. Ball, supra note 113, at 2735.
116. Id.
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the potential of the sex discrimination argument has not been
lost because of this, so far the predictions as to the reluctance of
the court to embrace this argument made by scholars in the
beginning of the nineties have proved justified. 117 That sex
discrimination argument is not a merely theoretical construct
can be proven with reference to the case law of the UN Human
Rights Committee, which interpreted article 26 of the
8
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights'"
accordingly. 119

III. GAY RIGHTS IN THE FREE MOVEMENT OF CITIZENS
CONTEXT
To agree with Koppelman, while "the consequence of our
moral divisions need not be hysteria or chaos[,]" it is clear that
"the largest concern arises from the fact that people move
around."' 120 What should happen to the legally married same-sex
couples when they move from one jurisdiction to another within
121
a federation? Clearly, "the answer should not be mysterious"' although in practice it is in many ways both in the EU and the
United States. Potentially, both the frameworks of private and
public law can offer nonmysterious answers the gay couples are
seeking.
A.

Member State-Level Solutions

Upon the introduction of homosexual marriages in four of
the twenty-seven EU member states, the legal landscape for such

117. See, e.g., Andrew Clapham & Joseph H.H. Weiler, Lesbians and Gay Men in the
European Community Legal Order, in HOMOSEXUALITY: A EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ISSUE 11,
21 (Kees Waaldijk & Andrew Clapham eds., 1993).
118. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171.
119. See U.N. Human Rights Comm. [HRC], Communication No. 941/2000: Views of
the Human Rights Committee Under Article 5, Paragraph4, of the Optional Protocol to the
10.2-13
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Young v. Australia),
(2003); HRC, Communication No. 488/1992: Views of the Human Rights Committee Under
Article 5, Paragraph4, of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and
PoliticalRights (Toonen v. Australia), 1 6.9-7.6 (1994).
120. Andrew Koppelman, Against Blanket Non-Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage, 17
YALEJ.L. & FEMINISM 205, 206 (2005).
121. Andrew Koppelman, Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages and Civil
Unions: A HandbookforJudges, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 2143, 2144 (2005).
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families, should they decide to use their EU citizenship right to
free movement, 22 remains fragmented. 123 Although same-sex
partnerships are recognized in the majority of the member
states, 124 some of the member states offer absolutely no rights to
same-sex couples. Italy, Ireland, the Baltic States, Romania,
Bulgaria, and Slovakia appear especially hostile to the idea of
1 25
legally recognizing same-sex relationships.
The application of sophisticated and at times contradictory
rules of private international law to same-sex marriage has a clear
impact on the rights of the couples in question. 126 Many scholars
agree that a simple conflict of laws is at stake here and thus usual
rules should apply. 127 A number of possible situations are
distinguished,1 2 8 including "the evasion scenario" and "mobile
marriage scenario," as well as "transient scenarios." 129 Yet, the
national courts of the member states "have neither allowed the
formalization of same-sex relationships nor have they recognized
same-sex relationships concluded abroad if specific statutory

122. TFEU, supra note 23, art. 21, 2008 O.J. C 115, at 57; EC Treaty, supra note 23,
art. 18, 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 49-50.
123. For an overview of national legislation and practices of EU member states
concerning the legal recognition of same-sex relationships, see Katharina Boele-Woelki,
The Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships Within the European Union, 82 TUL. L. REv.
1949 (2008). For the comparison between free movement of same-sex couples in the EU
and in the United States, see Adam Weiss, Federalism and the Gay Family: Free Movement of
Same-Sex Couples in the United States and the European Union, 41 COLUM.J.L. & SOC. PROBS.
81 (2007).
124. See ILGA-Europe, supra note 18.
125. See Boele-Woelki, supra note 123, at 1960. The EU itself is partly to blame for
the current legal-political climate in the Eastern European member states, as not
enough has been done with regard to gay rights during the pre-accession process
leading to the incorporation of these states into the Union. Kochenov, supra note 20.
126. For an example of sophistication of such rules see Linda Silberman, Same-Sex
Marriage:Refining the Conflict of Laws, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2195 (2005) (using the United
States as an example).
127. See, e.g., id. at 2198.
128. See Boele-Woelki, supra note 123, at 1952-53; Koppelman, supra note 120, at
2143; Silberman, supra note 126, at 2198-209.
129. For a compelling analysis, see Andrew Koppelman, Same-Sex Marriage, Choice of
Law, and PublicPolicy, 76 TEX. L. REV. 921 (1998). See also Andrew Koppelman, Interstate
Recognition of Same-Sex Civil Unions after Lawrence v. Texas, 65 OHIO ST. LJ. 1265 (2004);
Andrew Koppelman, Same-Sex Marriageand Public Policy: The Miscegenation Precedents, 16
QUINNIPAC L. REv. 105 (1996) [hereinafter Koppelman, Same-Sex Marriage & Pub.
Policy]; Mark Strasser, For Whom the Bell Tolls: On Subsequent Domiciles'Refusing to Recognize
Same-Sex Marriages, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 339 (1998); Koppelman, supra note 120;
Koppelman, supra note 121.
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rules are lacking." 130 They barely moved beyond the tautological
explanations of the first U.S. cases involving same-sex couples,
building on a proposition that "same-sex couples... [are] not
constitutionally entitled to marry because they... [are] not
eligible to marry ....
31
The result of this stance is an entirely chaotic situation with
marriage recognition in Europe, unable to withstand any
minimal test of common sense and legal certainty. So while a
Dutch same-sex marriage is treated in Belgium, France, Spain,
and Sweden like marriage,13 2 it is not recognized at all in Poland
3
and treated as a registered partnership in the United Kingdom.
The contrary is also possible: foreign-registered same-sex
partnerships resembling marriage are recognized in Belgium as
same-sex marriages. 13 4 Private-law approaches to the recognition
of same-sex marriages in the EU have abundantly demonstrated
their inability to tackle the outstanding issues. The courts are too
timid or hostile and the legislatures are unwilling to guide them.
All of this notwithstanding, the situation in the EU seems to be
giving more ground for optimism than that in the United States.

130. Boele-Woelki, supra note 123, at 1949.
131. Ball, supra note 113, at 2752.
132. See Boele-Woelki, supra note 123, at 1964 n.93 (noting that certain conditions
apply (citing Effet en France du mariage homosexuel valablement cql~br6 dans un pays
de l'Union europ~enne, Rep. Min. No. 41533 of July 26, 2005, Journal Officiel de la
R~publique Frangaise [JO.] [Official Gazette of France],July 26, 2005, p. 7437)); see also
Boele-Woelki et al., The Evaluation of Same-Sex Marriages and Registered Partnershipsin the
Netherlands, 8 Y.B. PRIVATE INT'L L. 27 (2006).
133. For some examples of how recognition of same-sex marriages functions (or
does not function) in the EU, see Boele-Woelki, supra note 123, at 1963-70. See also
MATITEO BONINI BARALDI, DIFFERENT FAMILIES, SAME RIGHTS? FREEDOM AND JUSTICE IN
THE EU: IMPLICATIONS OF THE HAGUE PROGRAMME FOR LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND
TRANSGENDER FAMILIES AND THEIR CHILDREN 21-23 (2007). Bonini Baraldi provides an
example in which the Italian state recognized a same-sex marriage of its employee
posted in Brussels, thus deviating from the stance of the Italian courts regarding such
recognitions impossible. Id. at 23.
134. Dutch same-sex partnerships constitute an exception, as Dutch same-sex
marriages, not partnerships,are treated as marriages in Belgium. See Circulaire du 29 mai
2007 modifiant la circulaire du 23 septembre 2004 relative aux spects de la loi dujuillet
2004 portant le Code de droit international priv6 consernant le statut personnel, 177
MONITEUR BELGE [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF BELGIUM] 29,469 (May 31, 2007). The
recognition of partnerships and marriages can be very problematic in itself, as not all
individuals entering a partnership necessarily would like to be married, or recognized as
married.
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In the United States, the issue is complicated by the federal
Defence of Marriage Act ("DOMA") 135 and state-level "miniDOMA" acts, 1-6 which potentially break the coherence of the
rules determining which law is to apply by attempting to
introduce blanket nonrecognition of same-sex marriages. Strong
arguments exist explaining the unconstitutionality of this
approach. 137 But for now this is the law. Miscegenation analogies
are very helpful in analyzing the potential limitations of these
acts, as even the states penalizing miscegenation (note that no
mini-DOMA penalizes same-sex marriages) 38 used to recognize
marriages between whites and blacks 139 when legally concluded
in other states before the couple changed residence, as
Koppelman has abundantly demonstrated. 140 Consequently, in
theory at least, "[a] prohibition on same-sex marriage-even one
expressed in legislation-does not necessarily mean that all
economic benefits should be denied."1 41 Although Europe does
not have its own DOMA (only the Vatican, with equally blurred
and identically negative powers in this respect), the cases of
recognition of same-sex marriages in member states not allowing
for such marriages under their national legislation are extremely
rare. 142 Private law failed the field test.

135. Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C
(2008)).
136. For current information on the positions taken by states on same sex marriage
(including mini-DOMA and constitutional amendments), see DOMA Watch, Issues by
State, http://www.domawatch.org/stateissues/index.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2009).
137. See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Dumb and DOMA: Why the Defense of MarriageAct
is Unconstitutional,83 IOwA L. REv. 1, 24-32 (1997); Koppelman, supra note 120, at 21015.
138. Should it be the case, it would be awkward in the light of Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
139. At the same time, these partnerships were considered as "connections and
alliances so unnatural that God and nature seem to forbid them." Koppelman, Same-Sex
Marriage& Pub. Policy, supranote 129, at 1270 n.28 (quoting Kinnely v. Commonwealth,
71 Va. (30 Gratt.) 858, 869 (1878)).
140. Id. at 105; see also Strasser, supra note 129, at 340 n.1l.
141. Silberman, supra note 126, at 2209.
142. For some examples of (partial) recognition of same-sex marriages by the
member state with no statutory provisions allowing for it,
see Bonini Baraldi, supra note
133, at 22-23.
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EU-Level Solutions

The EU is an obvious candidate for the introduction of at
least some consistency into the current situation with gay
couples' rights through the use of EU (i.e. public) law. The force
to drive the EU in this direction is not to be its will to take up the
regulation of family issues in Europe, which is not within its
sphere of competences at the moment, but the necessity to
safeguard the internal market, 143 of which free movement of
persons is an integral part. Moreover, agreeing with Advocate
General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, "it is not a question of developing
'European matrimonial law' but of ensuring that the principle
that there should be no discrimination based on sex is fully
effective." 144 In other words, two approaches are potentially
instrumental in changing the stance that EU law currently holds
toward same-sex couples: (1) internal market reasoning (with
appeals to strict limitations on any potential deviations from
internal market law); and (2) sex discrimination reasoning.
In a situation in which an EU citizen's status can undergo a
fundamental change as a result of crossing one of the internal
borders within the EU, the achievement of the ideal of economic
integration 45 and, specifically, freedom of movement of citizens,
becomes very problematic. It is the court's obligation to make
sure that the law of the Union remains a functional instrument of
integration, rather that a hostage to the diversities between the
differences in the legal systems of the member states. 146 The main
right of EU citizenship, which is free movement, cannot be made
dependent on the sex or, for that matter, the sexual preferences
of citizens: article 20 TFEU (article 17 EC) that established this
143. SeeTFEU, supra note 23, art. 26(2), 2008 O.J. C 115, at 59; EC Treaty, supra
note 23, art. 14(2), 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 48.
144. Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, KB. v. Nat'l Health Serv.
Pensions Agency, Case C-117/01, [2004] E.C.R. 541, 76.
145. See TEU Post-Lisbon, supra note 23, art. 3, 2008 OJ. C 115, at 17; EC Treaty,
supra note 23, art. 2, 2006 OJ. C 321 E, at 44.
146. The first opportunity to clarify the law almost arose for the ECJ in 2004, when
an immigration case involving a U.S. citizen married to a German citizen of the same sex
in the Netherlands was heard in Austria, to where the couple moved from the Low
Countries. Although European law was obviously applicable, the Austrian constitutional
court dismissed the case without granting residence rights or using article 267 TFEU
(article 234 EC) procedure. See Austria's ConstitutionalCourt Dismisses Same-Sex Freedom of
Movement
Case,
ILGA,
Apr.
11,
2004,
http://www.ilga.org/
newsresults.asp?LanguagelD=1&FileCategory=1&FileID=367.
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ius tractum status does not make either the possession of it, or the
array of rights stemming from it, dependent on sex. 4 7 The TFEU
thus makes it clear that possessing EU citizenship should logically
be enough in order to qualify for the full free movement rights
offered by article 21 TFEU (article 18 EC), your sex
notwithstanding.

148

The internal market logic underlying the European
integration process should nevertheless be used with caution,
despite all of its potential. Sometimes free movement, although
extremely important, is invoked to hide other issues, probably
unpopular with the majority of citizens. Agreeing with Weiss,
"arguments for respecting same-sex couples' right to travel may
appear to be nothing more than an elaborate ruse to avoid the
larger question posed by simple equal protection claim." 149 For
many reasons this theoretical supremacy occurs often in EU law:
free movement enjoys apparent precedence in the legal thinking

and discourse, taking a place above other, presumably more
fundamental, rights. 150 This is not to say that free-movement logic
is not to be used. Although it can misrepresent or even hide the
core issues at stake, it is certainly to be employed as a legal tool in
the quest for the broadening of the scope of rights enjoyed by
sexual minorities.
Besides the ECJ, other EU institutions are equally obliged to
do everything in their power to facilitate the achievement of the
goals of integration. 15 1 At present, their capacity, and willingness

147. TFEU, supra note 23, art. 20, 2008 O.J. C 115, at 56-57; EC Treaty, supra note
23, art. 17, 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 49.
148. TFEU, supra note 23, art. 21(1), 2008 O.J. C 115, at 57; EC Treaty, supra note
23, art. 18(1), 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 49.
149. Weiss, supra note 123, at 121-22.
150. The ECJ repeatedly refused to introduce hierarchy between the four freedoms
and fundamental rights, opting instead for a flexible case-by-case analysis. See, e.g.,
Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzfige v. Osterreich, Case C112/00, [2003] E.C.R. 5659.
151. The duty of loyalty of article 4(3) TEU Post-Lisbon (article 10 EC) does not
only bind the member states, but also the institutions of the EU. Imm., Zwartveld and
Others, Case 2/88, [1990] E.C.R. 1-3365, 1 1 (recognizing the EU institutions' duty of
cooperation with national judicial authorities). See generally John Temple Lang,
Developments, Issues, and New Remedies-The Duties of National Authorities and Courts Under
Article 10 of the EC Treaty, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1904, 1905-06 (2004) (discussing the
duty of loyalty within the context of article 10).
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to act in the area of gay rights, varies greatly. 15 2 This is explained
by the nature of the powers of the EU and the interests
represented by each of the institutions. Consequently, it would
be difficult to expect the council, for instance, to advocate gay
rights. An institution chiefly representing the interests of the
member states, many of which are still quite uncomfortable with
the idea of gay rights protection, is thus unlikely to play an
important role here. The abilities of the commission are limited
because of a different consideration. The powers of the EU to act
in the domain of family law are largely limited to the realm of
negative integration, consisting in outlawing the national
legislation and policies of the member states with a potential to
harm the achievement of the goals of integration. Besides the
court, holding the keys to the practical application of "negative
integration," the European Parliament seems to be the only
institution that is "pro-gay." Although the resolutions it
releases 153 do not have binding force of a law, 154 they obviously
enjoy important political weight. The European Parliament used
this
tool
on
a
number
of occasions,
advocating
nondiscrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in a variety
of contexts ranging from employment relationships to
marriage 155 and accession of the new member states. 156 Also,
individual members of the European Parliament ("MEP") have

152. For an assessment of institutional involvement in dealing with diversity in the
EU, see Gabriel N. von Toggenburg, Who Is Managing Ethnic and CulturalDiversity Within
the European Condominium? The Moments of Entry, Integration and Preservation, 43 J.
COMMON MKT. STUD. 717, 719 (2006).
153. See, e.g., European Parliament Resolution on Homophobia in Europe,
P6_TA(2007)0167; European Parliament Resolution on the Increase in Racist and
Homophobic Violence in Europe, P6_TA(2006)0273; European Parliament Resolution
on Homophobia in Europe, P6TA(2006)0018; European Parliament Resolution on
Equal Rights for Gays and Lesbians in the European Community, 1998 O.J. C 313/186;
European Parliament Resolution on Equal Rights for Homosexuals and Lesbians in the
European Community, 1994 O.J. C 61/40.
154. See Bruno de Witte, Legal Instruments, Decision-Makingand EU Finances,in THE
LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 273, 292 (Paul J.G.

Kapteyn et al. eds, 4th rev. ed. 2008).
155. E.g., European Parliament Resolution on Equal Rights for Homosexuals and
Lesbians in the European Community, 1994 O.J. C 61/40.
156. E.g., European Parliament Resolution on Equal Rights for Gays and Lesbians
in the European Community, 1998 O.J. C 313/186.
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been active in condemning homophobia and arguing for equal
57
rights for the sexual minorities.
Following
a
history
of
reluctance
to
accept
nondiscrimination on the basis of sexual orientation as one of
the principles of EU law and having seemingly ruled out a
possibility to hold that sexual orientation discrimination is
actually sex discrimination, 158 the ECJ has earned a very orthodox
image as far as the protection of sexual minorities is concerned.
In fact, notwithstanding the availability of the legal instruments at
hand, it simply refused to protect sexual minorities, opting
instead for rhetorical arguments lacking common sense from the
159
era of miscegenation laws in the United States.
The stance of the court had to change with the introduction
of article 19 into the TFEU (article 13 into the EC Treaty) at
Amsterdam and the adoption of the equality directive based on
this article. 160 Yet, in the use of the directive, the court proved
absolutely reluctant to demonstrate any measure of activism
161
whatsoever to protect the newly-acquired rights of gay citizens.
Most recently, the reluctance of the ECJ to protect the EU legal
order from the clashes between the national understandings of
"family" (and related issues) became apparent in its Tadao
Maruko decision.162 The court ruled:
The combined provisions of Articles 1 and 2 of Directive
2000/78 preclude legislation ... under which, after the
death of his life partner, the surviving partner does not
receive a survivor's benefit equivalent to that granted to a
surviving spouse, even though, under national law, life
partnership places persons of the same sex in a situation
comparable to that of spouses so far as concerns that
survivor's benefit. It is for the referring court to determine
whether a surviving life partner is in a situation comparable
157. See, e.g., Gay and Lesbian Rights Intergroup, European Parliament, Current
News, http://www.lgbt-ep.eu/news.php (last visited Oct. 11, 2009).
158. See supra Part II.
159. E.g, Grant v. South-West Trains Ltd., Case C-249/96, [1998] E.C.R. 621.
160. Council Directive No. 2000/78/EC, 2000 O.J. L 303/16. For the analysis of the
directive, see, for example, Waaldijk, supra note 80, at 17.
161. For an overview of the relevant case law, see Gabriel N. von Toggenburg,
"LGBT" Go Luxembourg: On the Stance of Lesbian Gay Bisexual and TransgenderRights Before
the European Court ofJustice, EUR. L. REPORTER 174, 180 (2008).
162. Maruko v.Versorgungsanstalt der Deutschen Bfhnen, Case C-267/06, [2008]
E.C.R. 1-01757.
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to that of a spouse who is entitled to the survivor's
163
benefit ....
In other words, the application of EU law on
nondiscrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is made
totally dependent on the national legal regulation of same-sex
partnerships. While, on the face of it, the ECJ protected the right
of Maruko to receive the pension of his pre-deceased partner, the
court also reconfirmed
its own reluctance
to
treat
nondiscrimination on the basis of sexual orientation seriously in
the EU legal context. It is impossible but to agree with von
Toggenburg that the court "provides no protection against
discrimination where it is most needed";1 64 if the national law on
same-sex partnerships either provides a legal framework
significantly different from marriage, which is the case in many
member states, or is simply nonexistent, the ECJ will not find a
violation of the directive. In other words, Maruko is "a slap in the
face of any effet utile reasoning so commonly used by the Court of
Justice." 165 In the constant tension between unity and diversity,
the unity of EU law seems to be losing ground: whether the court
finds discrimination depends entirely on the national law of the
member states.
This situation begs the question of what is actually the point
of prohibiting discrimination at the supranational level? It is
clearly impossible that the ECJ would not be confronted with this
issue during its deliberations, which means that subjecting EU
law on equality to national law is a choice made by the court for
some strange purpose. Once this is clear, somewhat less room for
optimism is left for those who expect the court to actively
promote equality and human rights. This is notwithstanding the
commission's position that "the issue of eradication of
discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation is directly linked
to the broader issue of fundamental rights and freedoms. ' 166 All
the history of gay rights protection in the EU suggests that we
have a truly orthodox court ready to sacrifice unity and effet utile
of EU law only to make sure that the narrowest possible reading

163. Id. 73.
164. Von Toggenburg, supra note 161, at 181 (emphasis omitted).

165. Id. at 182.
166. Reply of Mr. Flynn, on behalf of the Commission, to Written Question E2224/96, 1996 O.J. C 365/95, at 95.
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is given to the Treaty instruments and secondary legislation
aimed at safeguarding the rights of gay EU citizens.
C.

EU Law Entry Options Analyzed

However the ECJ (mis)interprets the law, the difference
between national regulation of family among the member states,
coupled with free movement of citizens law in the EU guarantee
that the exit option is always available. What is not yet clear,
however, is the accessibility of the "entry option" that European
federalism is likely to provide. The entry option comes down to
bringing the status legally acquired in one of the member states
to your member state of residence. In the light of Directive
2004/38/EC, 167 three different situations affecting the nascent
entry option can be looked at in the context of same-sex couples'
free movement. They concern free movement of couples legally
married in one of the member states, 168 free movement of
registered partners, and free movement of cohabiting couples. As
will be demonstrated in the following pages, all the necessary
tools to bring about an effective entry option in all the three
situations described are already in the hands of the ECJ. The
question is, then, whether the court, whose gay-rights
jurisprudence has so far been very limited, indeed will be willing
to use the instruments at its disposal?
Before outlining the relevant provisions of the Citizen's Free
Movement Directive, it is necessary to turn to the wording of
article 19 of the TFEU (article 13 EC). Advocate General Poiares
Maduro outlined the aims of this article in the protection of
dignity and autonomy of persons belonging to suspect
classifications. 169 Interpreting the directive, even though article
19 TFEU is not among its legal bases, this should always be kept
in mind, as the "adoption of legislation that would be
inconsistent with (article 19 TFEU) aims and spirit and limit the
protection that the drafters of the treaty intended to offer" 170 is

167. Council Directive No. 2004/38/EC, 2004 O.J. L 158/77. For analysis of this
directive, see, for example, MARK BELL, EU DIRECTIVE ON FREE MOVEMENT AND SAMESEX FAMILIES: GUIDELINES ON THE IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS (2005).

168. This does not necessarily cover marriages concluded outside of the EU.
169. See Opinion of Advocate General Maduro, Coleman v. Attridge Law, Case C8-10.
303/06, [2008] E.C.R. 1-5603,
170. Id. at 7.
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illegal. This observation acquires amplified relevance once the
instruments having article 19 TFEU as a legal basis are
considered. It is especially important to see Directive
2000/78/EC 171 in the context of national law: the law
implementing the directive cannot possibly result in legalization
of discrimination on any of the prohibited grounds which article
19 TFEU covers. Yet, as the court has demonstrated in Maruko,172
it can still take a while before such common-sense reading of the
directive is established in the law, as applied. At present,
strangely, the effet utile of EU law is made dependent on the
national law of the member states, which cannot last long, as it
clearly contradicts the very rationale of the European legal order.
Out of all the three situations outlined, the entry option for
the married same-sex couple seems the easiest to establish.
73
Having specified that a "family member means ...the spouse,"
Directive 2004/38/EC arguably makes it impossible to argue that
174
only different-sex spouses are covered, because, as Bell argued,
it would clearly introduce discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation prohibited by the same directive. 175 He went on:
"marriage is a status granted by national law; therefore, the EU
should not distinguish between legally contracted marriages
within the Member States."' 176 While, logically speaking, there is
no reason to disagree with what Bell submits, the directive does
not function like this in practice, as the member states refuse to
treat legally contracted same-sex marriage from other member
177
states as marriages.

171. 2000 O.J. L 303/16.
172. Maruko v. Versorgungsanstalt der Deutschen Bihnen, Case C-267/06, [2008]
E.C.R. 1-1757.
173. Council Directive No. 2004/38/EC, art. 2(2), 2004 O.J. L 158/55, at 88; see
also Reed v. Netherlands, Case 59/85, [1986] E.C.R. 1283,
16. In Reed, the reference
was in the context of interpretation of the term "spouse" in article 10(1) of regulation
1612/68, on freedom of movement of workers within the EC. See Reed, [1986] E.C.R.
1283,
16; Council Regulation No. 1612/68, art. 10(1), 1968 J.O. L 257/2, at 5, O.J.
Eng. Spec. Ed. 1968 (II) at 475, 477.
174. See BELL, supra note 167, at 5.
175. See Council Directive No. 2004/38/EC, pmbl. 31, 2004 O.J. L 158, at 86.
176. BELL, supra note 167, at 5.
177. ILGA-Europe, Freedom of Movement, http://www.ilga-europe.org/europe/
campaigns-projects/freedom of movement (last visited Nov. 17, 2009) (observing the
resistance of some member states to include same-sex married couples in the directive).
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Moreover, in D & Sweden, the ECJ pointed to the fact that it
views marriage as a union between the persons of opposite sex,
justifying this position by the general acceptance of such
approach by the member states. 178 Since the time when D &
Sweden was decided the reality has changed significantly: four
member states allow same-sex couples to get married. Other
member states (such as France), not having such law on the
books, nevertheless recognized same-sex marriages legally
concluded in Belgium, the Netherlands, and Spain as
"marriages." 179
Yet, the ECJ can repeat the "different sex" mantra also in
the future. This is so because the constitutional traditions of the
member states inspiring it should not be identical or similaronce the majority is clear, some member states can simply be
"outvoted" among their peers. The situation is complicated by
the fact, as Canor also highlighted, that no clear methodology
has been used by the court so far with regard to detecting the
legal traditions common to the member states, as the court "has
not developed an intelligible, generally accepted, and
consistently applied theory of interpretation."'18 0 In practice this
means that the "common traditions" can actually be used
virtually randomly in order to support whatever decision the ECJ
has already come to.' 8' Dealing with a Maruko Court, 8 2 having D
& Sweden 183 (to say nothing of Grant)184 among its achievements,
it is most unlikely that the ECJ will actually help to defend
fundamental EU rights of gay citizens, preferring instead to stick

178. D & Sweden v. Council, Joined Cases C-122, 125/99P, [2001] E.C.R. 1-4319,
34. For the analysis of this case in front of the Court of the First Instance, see Christine
Denys, Homosexuality: A Non-Issue in Community Law?, 24 EUR. L. REV. 419 (1999).
179. Gay Couples with Foreign Marriages,PartnershipsWin Recognition Battle in France,
UK GAY NEWS, Apr. 29, 2009, http://ukgaynews.org.uk/Archive/09/Apr/2901.htm.
180. Canor, supra note 91, at 272, 282 n.45 (collecting an informative selection of
literature).
181. See generally IRIS CANOR, THE LIMITS OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION IN THE
EUROPEAN COURT OFJUSTICE, SECURITY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS ISSUES (1998).
182. Maruko v. Versorgungsanstalt der Deutschen Biihnen, Case C-267/06, [2008]
E.C.R. 1-01757.
183. D & Sweden v. Council, Joined Cases 122/99P & 125/99P, [2001] E.C.R. I4319.
184. Grant v. South-West Trains Ltd., Case C-249/96, [1998] E.C.R. 621.
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to rhetorical arguments for a "stereotyped notion of the
85
European family."1
If the court chooses to act this way, should the opportunity
arise, it will undermine the idea of member states' autonomy in
the issues of family law, since it will ignore the legal definitions of
family adopted by three member states. Moreover, it will also
depart from a long tradition of respecting fundamental legal
statuses grounded in national law of the member states in the
situations when harmonization of acquisition of such statuses has
not occurred. When the treaties do not grant the Union powers
to decide on a certain fundamental status, the member states
should be left free to confer such a status and could reasonably
expect the ECJ to defend the choice they made, should any other
member state disagree to recognize the status conferred. The
status of "nationality for the purposes of Community law" is a
good illustration of this practice. 186 Not only the member states
were free to decide who their nationals for the purposes of
Community (and now Union) law are (a status which EU itself
cannot confer): the ECJ in Micheletti also famously defended the
ability of member states to do so without running a risk of having
such a status not recognized by any other member state of the
87
EU.1
By analogy, the same should apply to family. Although the
EU is not entitled to establish a "matrimonial law of the Union,"
it certainly should oblige the member states to respect each
others' definitions of family. Just as "nationality for the purposes
of Community law," "family" is a notion fundamental for the
functioning of the internal market, as both notions affect EU
citizens' ability to benefit from the right of free movement of
article 21 TFEU (article 18 EC). 188 Consequently, within the
scope of application of EU law, the member states cannot

185. Caracciolo di Torella & Reid, supra note 25, at 84.
186. Stephen Hall, Determining the Scope Ratione Personae of European Citizenship:
Customary InternationalLaw Prevails for Now, 28 LEGAL ISSUES OF ECON. INTEGRATION

355, 360 (2001). This is not to say that such practice is always beneficial for the
development of EU law; it is better than nothing. However, vague customary law rules
prevail for now. See id.
187. See Micheletti v. Delegaci6n del Gobierno en Cantabria, Case C-369/90,
[1992] E.C.R. 4239.
188. TFEU, supra note 23, art. 21, 2008 O.J. C 115, at 57; EC Treaty, supra note 23,
art. 18, 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 49.
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possibly be given the right to disagree with the fundamental
status choices legally made by other member states of the Union.
Here, an entry option comes naturally: the ECJ has to protect the
legally acquired marital status of same-sex couples once one of
the family members decides to exercise her free movement
rights.
Once the entry option is successfully implemented, the
application of the principle of nondiscrimination of article 18
TFEU (article 12 EC) and related lex specialis instruments18 9 to
the families exercising free movement rights will ensure that they
are entitled to the same rights as enjoyed by the local families,
resulting in full recognition. Were there no Grant,190 one would
be safe to suppose that the directive actually cannot be possibly
interpreted otherwise than as obliging the ECJ to defend the
legally acquired national-law statuses of EU citizens exercising
their free movement rights. Thus, while it is true that at present
"Community law accepts each Member State's definition of
marriage, singleness, widowhood, and the other forms of civil
(marital) status,"'191 this situation is likely to start changing in the
nearest future as, together with respect of the member states'
choices in this domain, there will come a requirement for the
member states to respect each others' legally conferred statuses.
This evolution is inescapable. Moreover, the next step to follow
this evolution, using European Court of Human Rights vision
demonstrated in Goodwin as an analogy, 192 is likely to be requiring
the analysis of equality that goes deeper than just the surface.
The European Court of Human Rights underlined in Goodwin
that "[i]t is of crucial importance that the Convention is
interpreted and applied in a manner which renders its rights
practical and effective, not theoretical and illusory." 193

189. TFEU, supra note 23, art. 45, 2008 O.J. C 115, at 65-66; EC Treaty, supra note
23, art. 39, 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 57-58. The same principle is also restated in Council
Directive No. 2004/38, art. 24(1), 2004 O.J. L 158/86, at 112.
190. Grant v. South-West Trains Ltd., Case 249/96, [1998] E.C.R. 621.
191. Opinion of Advocate
General
Ruiz-Jarabo
Colomer, Maruko
v.
Versorgungsanstalt der Deutschen Bohnen, Case C-267/06, [2008] E.C.R. 1-1757, 74.
192. Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 18 (2002) (ruling that the
United Kingdom violated the ECHR in not allowing postoperative transsexuals to have
their sex changed on the birth certificates, resulting in inability to marry the persons of
the sex that is identical to their preoperative sex).
193. Id. 74.
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Namely, if discrimination is a result of a national law that
makes the acquisition of a certain status leading to the
entitlement of nondiscrimination impossible, it is the court's
obligation to go further than restating the apparent lack of a
formal entitlement, asking the member state to justify its policy of
making certain (marital) statuses inaccessible for sexual
minorities.
Real protection of human rights, nondiscrimination on the
basis of sex included, should go beyond legal formalism, asking
the state to provide justifications for the obvious causes of
discrimination instead of looking for rhetorical justifications of
unjust policies. 194
The imposition of a requirement on the new member state
of residence, to duly recognize marriages legally contracted in
other member states at least dealing with the situations genuinely
falling within the material scope of EU law' 95 is fundamental in
order to guarantee that same-sex families that benefited from a
free movement right enjoy equal treatment with all the families
in the new member state of residence even if such a member
state does not allow gays residing there to marry. It can be even
more important, however, for the families where immigration law
issues can arise. 196 These include the families where both spouses
are EU citizens, but one of them does not qualify for self-standing
enjoyment of the citizenship free movement right, or families
consisting of an EU citizen and a third-country national.
In the first case, if the family status is not recognized and
one of the family members fails to meet the requirements of
article 7 of Directive 2004/38/EC, this person, just as the very
family, ends up in a legal limbo, since, although the ECJ
prohibited automatic deportations of EU citizens failing to meet

194. The Supreme Court of Hawaii took this position in Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d
44, 59 (Haw. 1993). That the state was required to justify its policy of not providing
same-sex couples with a possibility to marry, see id., is exemplary in this respect.
195. While there is case law and literature suggesting the need to prohibit the
"abuse" of the law, it is difficult to see how attempts to use legal opportunities offered by
the federal structure for the sake of being granted rights denied in your own member
state can possibly be frowned upon. But see FABIAN AMTENBRINK & HANS H.B. VEDDER,
RECHT VAN DE EUROPESE UNIE 302-05 (3d ed. 2008).
196. For analysis, see Lina Papadopoulou, In(di)visible Citizens(hip): Same-Sex Partners
in European Union ImmigrationLaw, 21 Y.B. EUR. L. 229 (2002).
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the requirements of the directive, 197 the family member's legal
situation will not be flawless. In practice this does not usually
cause any problems, as there are virtually no practical checks in
the member states aimed at the compliance with the rules of the
directive. 198 However, it can potentially turn problematic in some
situations related to access to healthcare and unemployment
benefits.
The second situation can have much more drastic
consequences for the family, as the third country national can
simply be deported from the new member state of residence,
should the family not be recognized. 199 In practice this means
that the nonrecognition brings about the "illegality" of the thirdcountry national spouse. Since the free movement rights of the
third country nationals in such situations are purely derivative
from the rights of an EU citizen, 200 the nonrecognition of a
family status effectively means the disappearance of all the EU
law rights, including the right to enter and the right to remain
for the third-country national spouse.
Similar problems can also arise under the Directive on the
Rights of Third Country Nationals Who Are Long Term
Residents. 20 1 The directive allows for a limited free movement
right of third country nationals in possession of the "EC
Residence Permit."20 2 This right includes an entitlement to move

197. See Commission v. Belgium, Case C-408/03, [2006] E.C.R. 1-2647, 72.
198. See Commission of the European Communities, The Application of Directive
2004/38/EC on the Right of Citizens of the Union and Their Family Members to Move and
Reside Freely within the Territory of the Member States: Report from the Commission to the
European Parliamentand Council,COM (2008) 840/3, at 8, 3.8.1.
199. On the rights of third-country nationals in the EU, see, for example, Georgia
Papagianni, Free Movement of Third Country Nationals on the Eve of 1 May 2004: Another
Missed Deadline?, in LA LIBRE CIRCULATION DE PERSONNES:

ETATS DES LIEUX ET

PERSPECTIVES 145 (Dominik Hanf & Rodolphe Mufioz eds., 2007); Martin HedemannRobinson, An Overview of Recent Legal Developments at Community Level in Relation to ThirdCountry Nationals Resident Within the European Union, with ParticularReference to the Case
Law of the European Court ofJustice, 38 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 525 (2001); Ian Ward, Law
and the OtherEuropeans,35J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 79 (1997). For analysis in the context
of European citizenship, see Kochenov, supra note 9, at 222-34.
200. Cddric Chenevi~vre, Regime juridique des ressortissantsd'Etats tiers membres de la
famille d'un citoyen de l'Union, in LA LIBRE CIRCULATION DE PERSONNES: ETATS DES LIEUX

ET PERSPECTIVES, supra note 199, at 125.
201. Council Directive No. 2003/109, 2004 OJ. L 16/44.
202. Id. art. 14(1), 2004 O.J. L 16/44, at 50. For analysis see Kochenov, supra note
9, at 225-29.
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from one member state to another 203 accompanied by your
"family." 20 4 The right of residence in the new member state is
conditional upon the exchange or a residence permit.2 05 Should
a same-sex marriage not be recognized in the new member state
of residence, the exchange of the residence permit will simply
not be performed by the new member state of residence,
resulting in a deprivation of one of the family members of the
right to enter and to remain in the new member state with his
husband.
However, for the reasons outlined above, EU law suggests
that the marital status legally acquired in one of the member
states would be recognized by all the other member states. 20 6 This
should not only be the case when an EU citizen is involved. Once
same-sex marriages involving an EU citizen are recognized,
nonrecognition of a same-sex marriage involving third-country
nationals concluded in one of the member states when they are
exercising their free movement right under Directive
2003/109/EC would constitute a clear violation of article 18
TFEU (article 12 EC), as this situation is certainly within the
scope of EU law and the article does not limit the notion of
"nationality" to the nationalities of the member states.20 7
The proper application of the Citizens' Free Movement
Directive with the ECJ defending the legal status acquired by the
couples in their previous member states of residence is likely to
exemplify, yet again, the most important drawback of the
citizenship of the EU, namely its lack of generality.20 8 More and
more instances of reverse discrimination will be created, as
203. Ireland, Denmark, and the United Kingdom are excluded from the scope of
application of the directive. Id. pmbl.
25-26, 2004 O.J. L 16/44, at 46.
204. Id. art. 16, at 51.
205. Id. art. 15, at 50-51.
206. See supra Parts III.B, III.C.
207. See TFEU, supra note 23, art. 18, 2008 O.J. C 115, at 56; EC Treaty, supra note
23, art. 12, 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 48. Although article 18 TFEU (article 12 EC) does not
contain any references to nationality, the ECJ tended to interpret it restrictively, only
allowing nondiscrimination on the basis of nationality between EU citizens. This
approach has to change, however, as more and more third-country nationals fall within
the scope of this provision. For one of the most compelling arguments for
reinterpretation, see Pieter Boeles, Europese burgers en derdelanders: Wat betekent het verbod
van discriminatie naar nationaliteit sinds Amsterdam?, 12 SOcIAAL-ECONOMISCHE
WETGEWING 502 (2005). For an overview of the problem, see Kochenov, supra note 9, at

206-09.
208. SeeVINCENzo LIPPOLIs, LA CITrADINANzA EUROPEA 20 (1994).
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married same-sex couples from Spain, Holland, and Belgium
move to member states disallowing same-sex marriages, like
Austria, Latvia, or Italy. With reverse discrimination allowed in
EU law, the legal entitlements of the couples who used their free
movement rights will be entirely different when compared with
those of the local couples that never moved anywhere, resulting
in a gap in protections and entitlements as unbridgeable as it is
logically unexplainable. So while a young, same-sex family that
moved from Belgium to Greece will be entitled to all the rights
enjoyed by heterosexual families in Greece, a gay Greek couple
can end up imprisoned even for having sex, as the ages of
consent for homosexual and heterosexual couples are still not
harmonized in Greece, 20 9 in breach of the law of the Strasbourg
human rights protection system. 210 In other words, the
cofunctioning of the legal systems of the EU and of the member
states can result in diametrically opposed rules of regulation
applied to EU citizens residing in the same jurisdiction, which is
a big problem begging for resolution. At the same time, the
ability of married same-sex couples from other member states to
benefit from more rights than local same-sex couples is likely to
put pressure of the national governments of the member states of
the EU to change national regulation, which can result in
positive reforms.
Free movement of registered partners is also covered by the
Citizens' Free Movement Directive, as it includes among family
members "the partner with whom the Union citizen has
contracted a registered partnership. ... "211 However, whether
the partnership actually falls within the scope of the directive is
made directly dependent on the national law of the host member
state, as it is only to be regarded as leading to a family member
status in the terms of article 2(2) (b) of the directive "if the
legislation of the host member state treats registered
partnerships as equivalent to marriage and in accordance with
the conditions laid down in the relevant legislation of the host
member state." 212 This wording is problematic, because, just as

209. See Interpol, Sex Offenses Laws-Greece, http://www.interpol.int/public/
children/sexualabuse/nationallaws/csagreece.asp (last updated Aug. 3, 2007).

210. E.g., Sutherland v. United Kingdom, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 182 (1997).
211. Council Directive No. 2004/38, art. 2(2)(b), 2004 OJ. L 158/77, at 88.
212. Id.
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the ECJ in Maruko,2 13 it brings the application of EU law in total
dependence on the national law of the member states. Autonomy
of the EU legal order is thus not guaranteed at all. As more
member states introduce the partnership option for the same-sex
couples, this provision can have important implications for the
rights of such couples. However disappointing the wording of the
directive, the court is unlikely to strike it down, meaning that the
same-sex couples will need to rely either on marriage or the
existence of a long-term relationship in order to acquire rights in
the new member state of residence should such state have no
usable same-sex partnership laws on the books.
The number of situations when reliance on marriage is
possible is limited, however. States allowing for same-sex unions
or marriages usually incorporate defences against "same-sex
marriage tourism" into their legislation, making sure that the
relevant legislation only applies to persons sufficiently connected
215
with the forum. 2 14 So to register a marriage in the Netherlands,
the partners need to be either citizens or residents of the
country. 216 The Belgian rules are even stricter, demanding that
the national law of each partner permits the marriage. 217 Spain
broadly followed; 218 however, in practice, the Spanish law is also
used to marry Spaniards and foreigners with no regard to the law
of the latters' countries of nationality. 219 It has been argued that
"[a] state or country makes that judgement not for the world at
213. Maruko v. Versorgungsanstalt der Deutschen Bu6hnen, Case C-267/06, [2008]
E.C.R. 1-01757.
214. This is not the case, for instance, in the Canadian provinces, where same-sex
marriage is allowed. For a discussion of the Canadian situation, see Mary J. Mossman,
Conversations About Families in Canadian Courts and Legislatures:Are There "Lessons"for the
UnitedStates ?,32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 171, 175-83 (2003).
215. Note that to say, specifically, "same-sex marriage" would be discriminatory,
hence the same rules should apply to homosexual and heterosexual marriages.
216. See Wet openstelling huwelijk [Law on Opening of Marriage], art. I.E, Stb. 9
(2001) (Neth.).
217. Loi ouvrant le mariage Asdes personnes de meme sexe et modifiant certaines
dispositions du Code civil, Wet tot openstelling van het huwelijk voor personen van
hetzelfde geslacht en tot wijziging van een aantal bepalingen van het Burgerlijk Wetboek
[Law Opening Marriage to Same-Sex and Amending Certain Provisions of the Civil
Code], ch. II, art. 7, 173 Stb. 9825 (2003) (Belg.).
218. Ley 13/2005, de 1 dejulio, por la que se modifica el C6digo Civil en materia
de derecho a contraer matrimonio [Law 13/2005 of July 1, Amending the Civil Code
Concerning the Right to Marriage] (B.O.E. 2005, 157) (Spain).
219. Tito Drago, Espafia: Matrimonio gay se internacionaliza, IPS NOTICIAS,
http://www.ipsnoticias.net/.asp?idnews=34585 (last visited Nov. Mar. 3017, 2009).
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large, but for a relevant community in which it has an interest." 220
Yet, to present providing people with an opportunity to marry as
an abuse of the law seems to be wrong. Besides being totally
arbitrary, restrictions on "marriage tourism" can potentially be
discriminatory as it makes the rights enjoyed by EU citizens
dependent on their nationality-a situation impossible within the
scope ratione materiae of EU law. 22 1 While the Dutch regulation
can withstand such criticism, as it uses residence as a criterion for
access to marriage, the Belgian rule, connecting access marriage
with nationality, not solely residence, is absolutely impermissible,
resulting in direct discrimination on the ground of nationality.
Any EU citizen legally residing in Belgium is entitled to the same
rights as Belgians. If Belgians can enter same-sex marriages,
excluding Polish or Greek residents of Belgium from access to
the same status would result in a violation of article 18 TFEU
(article 12 EC). Residence, however, is a valid consideration
under EU law. Given the small number of member states in
which same-sex marriage is allowed and the residence
requirement, it becomes clear that the absolute majority of samesex couples residing in the EU are excluded from a possibility to
marry, which amplifies the importance of EU law rules regulating
222
the situation of unmarried same-sex couples.
Unmarried partners who are unregistered are also
potentially covered by Directive 2004/38/EC. With regard to
such partners, the new member state of residence is obliged to
"facilitate entry and residence for... the partner with whom the
Union citizen has a durable relationship, duly attested." 223 Weiss
opined in this regard that marriage in another member state

220. Linda Silberman & Karin Wolfe, The Importance of PrivateInternationalLaw for
Family Issues in an Era of Globalisation:Two Case Studies-InternationalChild Abduction and
Same-Sex Unions, 32 HOFSTRA L. REv. 233, 247 (2003).
221. See TFEU, supra note 23, art. 18,2008 O.J. 115, at 56; EC Treaty, supra note 23,
art. 12, 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 48; see also Davies, supra note 58.
222. Marrying outside of the EU, in the countries where there is no residence
requirement (like Canada) is not the same thing, because EU law could not possibly
affect the rules of recognition of third-country marriages by the member states of the
EU.
223. Council Directive No. 2004/38, art. 3(2), 2004 O.J. L 158/77, at 89. The host
member state is also bound to "undertake an extensive examination of the personal
circumstances and shall justify any denial of entry or residence to these people" Id.
Similar wording is found in article 3(4) of the Family Reunification Directive. See
Council Directive No. 2003/86, art. 3(4), 2003 OJ. L 251/12, at 14.
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should attest the durable character of the relationship when
same sex couples who moved to a member state not recognizing
same sex marriages are concerned. 224 This is a tricky line of
reasoning to take. First of all, marriage should not necessarily be
concluded after long cohabitation or be a culmination of a
durable relationship: the members of a married couple moving
from one member state to another probably have only known
each other for a couple of days before deciding to get married
and to move. Does it affect the legality of their marriage?
Obviously not. Yet, such a marriage is unlikely to attest to a
durable charter of the relationship that the directive requires for
unmarried couples. Secondly, and more importantly, the nature
of rights granted to married and unmarried partners of EU
citizens using their free movement rights is different in the two
cases. While spouses get their rights protected automatically
under the literal reading of the directive, with the unmarried
couples the new member state of residence is solely obliged to
"facilitate" their entry and residence, which means that denying
225
it is also possible.
Sex discrimination argument is potentially crucial in order
to make free movement provision work for the unmarried samesex couples. Since, especially after Reed,226 the majority of the
member states easily allow nonmarried heterosexuals to reside
with their EU citizen partners upon the change of the member
state of residence, the same rules should apply to homosexual
227
couples too, as, following Koppelman's logic explained supra,
treating homosexual and heterosexual EU citizens differently in
such a situation will result in direct sex discrimination, outlawed
within the sphere of application of EU law and also by the CoE. 22 8
Should the court hesitate, the directive also prohibits sexual
orientation discrimination, which will also unavoidably catch
229
such situations.

224. SeeWeiss, supra note 123, at 104.
225. Council Directive No. 2004/38, art. 3(2), 2004 OJ. L 158/77, at 89.
226. Netherlands v. Reed, Case 59/85, [1986] E.C.R. 1283.
227. See supra Part II.

228. Karner v. Austria, 38 Eur. Ct. H.R. 528, 537 (2003).
229. Council Directive No. 2004/38, art. 31, 2004 O.J. L 158/77, at 86.
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All in all, given the ease with which nonmarried
heterosexual couples move around the EU, 230 it is clear that
moving from one member state to another with your same-sex
partner should not be a problem under the current legal
regulation. 231 This is not enough, obviously, especially when a
married same-sex couple is stripped of any marriage-related
rights as a consequence of nonrecognition of the marriage by the
new member state of residence. The ECJ is expected to step in,
once an opportunity arises, to defend the law-what it is obliged
to do under the treaties 232-and to protect the rights of gay EU
citizens. For now, the outline of the scope of rights enjoyed by
different categories of same-sex couples, especially compared
with the rights of heterosexual couples makes is absolutely clear
that European law has not moved away from the conjugal
hierarchy tacitly established by the court and the legislator years
ago, 233 putting a heterosexual married couple at the top of the
pyramid. Consequently, any couple that is not a heterosexual
family is surely entitled to fewer rights.
D. Impossible Exceptions and the Downturn of Family
Given the political climate in some member states, as well as
antigay public opinion,2 3 4 it is clear that once the entry option for
the gay families begins to function as it should within the
European Union, the less-liberal member states will do their best
to block the application of free movement to gay citizens' family

230. It is established case law that, as such, unmarried partners are covered by
Regulation 1612/68, falling within the meaning of the term "social advantage" of article
7(2) (to be afforded with no discrimination on the basis of nationality). See, e.g., Reed,
[1986] E.C.R. 1283, 28.
231. The great majority of industrialized democracies managed successfully to
decouple the issues of immigration and same-sex marriage, facilitating the immigration
of same-sex partners of citizens even where marriages between the persons of the same
sex are not allowed. For an overview study, see James D. Wilets, A ComparativePerspective
on Immigration Law for Same-Sex Couples: How the United States Compares to Other
IndustrialisedDemocracies, 32 NOVA L. REV. 327 (2008).
232. See TEU Post-Lisbon, supra note 23, art. 19(1), 2008 O.J. C 115, at 27; EC
Treaty, supra note 23, art. 220, 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 141.
233. See Daniel Borillo, Pluralisme conjugal ou hidrarchie des sexualits: La
reconnaissancejuridique des couples homosexuelles dans l'Union europeenne, 46 MCGILL L.J.
875,910 (2001).
234. See Waaldijk, supra note 80, at 21; see also Kochenov, Gay Rights in the EU, supra
note 19, at 482-86.
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members. Different exceptions are likely to be invoked in order
to justify discrimination.
As far as potential morality exceptions are concerned,
Karst's logic can be employed in the analysis of their potential
reach. In his fundamental essay on the freedom of intimate
association, Karst defended a point that "freedom does not imply
that the state is wholly disabled from promoting majoritarian
views of morality. What the freedom does demand is a serious
search for justifications by the state for any significant
impairment of values of intimate association."' 235 In other words,
"we must search for a state interest of very great importance."' 236
The states should not only be allowed to hide behind the screen
of "morality," serious justifications for any limitation need to be
provided. Once stricter scrutiny in such a context becomes a
dominating standard, the states will start losing overwhelmingly
and systematically, as the majority of antigay policies are
essentially entirely deprived of any sense and largely aim at the
perpetuation of prejudice, 237 being "the product of folklore and
fantasy rather then evidence of real risk of harm." 238 The
potential dangers of such new standard for the states' ability to
regulate marriage are evident. 239 Restricting marriage and
nonmarital intimate association will be extremely difficult, which
is a good thing, as "where marriage is involved.., the state does
not have a contracting party's choice to accept or reject a
240
compact."

235. Karst, supra note 1, at 627. Or, put differently, "[m]easured against the
freedom of intimate association, any governmental intrusion on personal choice of
living arrangements demands substantial justification, in proportion to its likely
influence in forcing people out of one form of intimate association and into another."
Id. at 687.
236. Id. at 672.
237. The need for the state of Hawaii to justify its policy of exclusion of same sex
couples from access to marriage was the bottom line of the Hawaii Supreme Court case
of Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 74 (Haw. 1993). The Hawaii Circuit Court then held that
the State failed to meet the strict standard with the policy justifications it provided. See
Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *21 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996). For
the analysis of other relevant cases decided by the U.S. state courts, see, for example,
Inching Down the Aisle: Differing Paths Toward the Legalization of Same-Sex Marriage in the
United States and Europe, 116 HARV. L. REv. 2004, 2016-20 (2003).
238. Karst, supra note 1, at 684-85.
239. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 399 (1978) (Powell,J., concurring); see
also Karst, supra note 1, at 670-71.
240. Karst, supra note 1, at 652.
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There is no room, in the European legal context, for the
imposition of Karst's vision on the member states willing to
suppress certain forms of intimate association at the national
level following the perceived interests of the majority of their
citizens. However, the Union can apply Karst's reasoning when
the law of such a member state is forming an obstacle for a
couple exercising free movement rights in the EU, i.e., once the
operability of the entry option is at stake. In a situation when the
achievement of the goals of the treaties is threatened, the strictest
scrutiny is to be required.
Unlike in the free movement of goods, 241 public morality is
not included among the TFEU grounds on which a member state
willing to justify a restriction can rely. While article 21 TFEU
(article 18 EC) allows for "limitations and conditions laid down
in [EC] Treaty and by measures adopted to give it effect"2 42 the
most commonly used lex specialis instrument, article 45 TFEU
(article 39 EC) only includes "public policy, public security and
public health"2 43 among the possible grounds. It seems that
deviating using these exceptions in order to justify
nonrecognition of same-sex partnerships or marriages is virtually
impossible, since, in the situation when the usability of health
and security arguments can be dismissed right away, public policy
244
cannot possibly consist in discriminating on the basis of sex.
The EU legal context is thus very similar to the United States in
this respect, as also in the United States "narrow approaches to

241. TFEU, supra note 23, art. 36, 2008 O.J. 115, at 61; EC Treaty, supra note 23,
art. 30, 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 53; see, e.g., Conegate Ltd. v. Her Majesty's Custom and
Excise, Case 121/85, [1986] E.C.R. 1007,
3 (interpreting article 30 EC (article 36
TFEU) strictly).
242. TFEU, supra note 23, art. 21(1), 2008 O.J. 115, at 57; EC Treaty, supra note 23,
art. 18(1), 2006 0.J. C 321 E, at 49-50.
243. TFEU, supra note 23, art. 45(3), 2008 O.J. 115, at 66; EC Treaty, supra note 23,
art. 39(3), 2006 OJ. C 321 E, at 57-58.
244. Such public policy would be in manifest disagreement with the principles-as
outlined in article 6 TEU post-Lisbon (article 6 TEU pre-Lisbon)-on which the Union
is founded and used to limit free movement of persons, will amount to the violation of
the duty of loyalty of article 4 TEU post-Lisbon (article 10 EC). See TEU post-Lisbon,
supra note 23, art. 6, 2008 O.J. C 115, at 19; TEU pre-Lisbon, supra note 23, art. 6, 2006
0.J. C 321 E, at 12; TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 23, art. 4(3), 2008 0J. C 115, at 18; EC
Treaty, supra note 23, art. 10, 2006 0.J. C 321 E, at 47. Moreover, rather than
disqualifying classes of citizens from moving into a particular member state, public
policy exceptions are to be grounded in personal conduct. See, e.g., Council Directive
No. 2004/38, art. 27(20), 2004 0.J. L 158/77, at 114.
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tradition and morality are constitutionally impermissible
justifications for denying individual liberties," 245 as the Supreme
246
Court made is absolutely clear in Lawrence v. Texas.
While it is ultimately up to the ECJ to establish the possible
extent of exceptions from the application of the entry option, the
text of the relevant provisions as well as the position usually taken
by the court in the cases involving deviations from the main
treaty rule make it clear that any exceptions are to be interpreted
restrictively and do not entitle the member states to discriminate
on the basis of sex. This means that EU law is unlikely to be of
assistance for any member state seeking exceptions from general
application of the law of free movement of persons in order to
respect the homophobic opinion of the majority.
CONCLUSION
Similarly to the possibility to limit the liberty of sexual
minorities to make free choices with regard to such vital issues as
marriage, immigration, adoption, and others, the member states
will necessarily lose their ability to autonomously regulate other
moral issues. This taming of the member states can only be
welcomed: as a result they have less possibility to intervene, in a
prohibitive way in the lives of persons within their jurisdiction.
With the help of European federalism, the member states' ability
to enforce the moral choices of the majorities on everyone is
deteriorating at an increasing pace.
Building on the example of gay rights this Article has
demonstrated that the member states will be bound to accept the
legal statuses repugnant to their local vision of "morality":
besides an "exit option" consisting in a legal right offered by a
federal system to change a state of residence to a less oppressive
one, in the European context federalism is developing an "entry
option" allowing citizens to bring the legal statuses conferred on
them by less restrictive jurisdictions to their new member state of
residence as they move around the Union making use of their
main EU citizenship right. Even though the ECJ is yet to
recognize such entry option with regard to gay EU citizens, it is

245. Marcus, supra note 3, at 304.
246. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003) (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens,J., dissenting)).
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bound to do so sooner or later as, notwithstanding all the
freedom it enjoys, its ability to interpret and apply the law contra
legem is limited.
By virtue of its very existence, the EU is bound to have an
overwhelmingly positive impact on the development of human
rights in the member states, as it constantly challenges their
ability to impose particular moral views on their populations. The
exit option that it provides empowers plenty of individuals who
would not have any future in "fully sovereign" states.
Complementing this basic federalism argument, the EU's
potential in the area of fostering liberty goes even further, which
is related to the "entry option" stemming directly from the
interplay between EU law and the law of the member states. The
"entry option" provides a unique opportunity for EU citizens to
benefit from more beneficial law in a legal setting that is
otherwise very restrictive. With the rising numbers of EU citizens
using such "entry options" the pressure on the more orthodox
member states will necessarily grow to change the laws and
practices in force.

